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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, carriers flying the American flag
have concentrated on U.S. trades. The advent of new
routing strategies in the container age has increas _
their ability to move cargo between foreign ports. As
a result, their dependence on these cargoes is growing.
An example is the "Sea Bridge" service, introduced by
United States Lines. With a round-the-world itinerary,
this service may very well depend upon cargo carried
between foreign ports in order to succeed.
The ability of United States Lines to capture these
foreign-to-foreign cargoes may be hampered by rising
protectionism worldwide. The analysis presented here
is in two separate disciplines. The first section is an
analysIs of the political impediments to cargo access
United States Lines potentially faces with their new
service. The second section is an economic analysis of
the service itself to determine its Viability.
The relevance of protectionism to the success of the
Sea Bridge service was then inferred by combining the two
sections. It was established that protectionism was a
threat over the long term. However, other factors, such
as the level of world trade, and the actions of competitors ,
would play a greater role in the success or failure of the
United States Lines service.
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CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INFORMATION
Introduction
The introduction of fully cellular round-the-world
container shipping services (RWS) caused a great deal of
controversy and speculation in the maritime community. The
actions of United States Lines (U.S. Lines) and, the Taiwanese
carrier Evergreen Lines have the potential to seriously alter
the shape of liner shipping. The systems created by theso
lines differ considerably; in that Evergreen appears to be
seeking the optimum ship routing configuration, wherp.as U.S.
Lines is introducing tremendous economies of scal~ in their
new buildings. The fact that the systems vary to' such ~
degree is an indication that no clear-cut formula exists for
success in RWS . Although certain carriers, such as Neptune
Orient. are introducing RWS. it does not appear tho Sllipping
community is rushin~ into the commencement of their own RWS.
There are unique advantages Offered by RWS as compared
to point to point shuttle services; however, they must compete
in the same world marketplace . A major trend in this market-
place is protectionism. In order to encourage their national
fleets, many nations practice cargo preferRnce and flag dis-
crimination. Prot~ctionism in shippin~ is not a new phenomenon,
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dating back to the Roman Empire (Von Sydow, 1978). Yet,
the emergence of the developing states in the past forty
years has increased the complexity of problems involved in
protectionism. The idea of freely competitive cargo access
may be archaic in light of developments in the last decade.
Shipping nationalism appears to be gathering momentum, and
serious changes to the world trading system are inevitable.
However, the shipping industry does not easily lend itself to
rapid change; therefore, the introduction of legitimized pro-
tectionism should be considered evolutionary in nature.
In order for the RWS to be successful, the operators
must have access to crosstrade cargoes. Crosstrade cargoes
are cargoes carried between two nations aboard a vessel that
flies a different flag from those ' of the trading nations. The
focus here will be on the u.S. Lines service. It is hypothe-
sized that the denial of access to crosstrade cargoes will be
a key element in the success or failure of the RWS. An impor-
tant factor in keeping crosstrades open will be the response
of the United States Government to protectionist actions of
foreign governments and shipping interests.
This paper will attempt to measure the potential impacts
of protectionism upon the u.S. Lines RWS. The very nature of
protectionism, as well as the fact that the RWS has yet to be
fully developed, places much of the subject matter in the realm
of speculation. Both economic and political factors will be
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subjected to analysis. From the corobination of all the
considerations a conclusion will be established which will
determine whether the RWS is sufficiently marginal economi-
cally to b~ rendered unprofitable by protectionist actions . .
An Overview of Maritime Economics
Maritime economics is a discipline which is associated
wi th the volatile field of world trade. Shippinq is a "de-
rived industry, versus an industry which stands alone. The
increasing politicization of world trade increases the com-
plexity of maritime economics, as in excess of 99 percent of
world trade is seaborne.
The reasons for world trades, as Branch, 1982 discussed,
include:
1. The uneven distribution of natural resources
worldwide.
2. The effects of climate upon cultivation.
3. The inability of certain nations to produce
i terns needed.
4. The implication of "Comparative advantages",
that it is advantageous for nations to
specialize in the forms of production in
which they have superior production factors.
Benefits of trade include reduction in prices of certain
goods, greater product variety, and wider markets which. can
create economies of scale in production.
The idea of a world in which nations specialize in
producing those goods in which they are most·efficient, and
trade those goods for needed items, is clouded by political
considerations. Governments have differing priorities, and
may divert from a free trade attitude because of security, or
internal economic conditions. The emergence of the Third
World, since World War II, has caused a shift of world trades
toward developing countries. The world shipping community has
followed this trend, and more ships are owned and operated by
developing nations.
Shipping is an "invisible" rather than "visible" factor
in world trade. Visible factors are tangible qoods for which
costs are readily apparent. Invisibles, such as shipping or
finance, can exert a great influence on the landed costs of a
commodity; thus deterrninina whether or not that commodity can
move in world trade (Juda, 1981). Shipping also exerts a major
behind-the-scenes effect on the health of nations. It has been
suggested that maritime economists evaluate the social costs of
shipping service to a nation, in addition to financial costs.
As an invi~ible expen~e, ~hipping can also effect a nation's
balance of payments with other countries. The industry also
provides employment opportunities. If a nation produces products
in wh~ch the comparative advantage is small, or the demand is
fairly elastic, the cost of shipping can influence that nationls
ability to sell its products in the world market. Thus, invest-
ment in shipping may be warranted, although the service itself
may not be a profit maker.
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Maritime transportation involves long-term investment
of substantial amounts of capital in a business which can be
altered by short-term political and economic events. A ship-
owner must make judgements concerning the design of his vessel,
which may effect his operations ten to twenty years into the
future. A general rule is that a shipowner seeks the slowest,
smallest vessel to do the job it is intended to do. However,
a versatile vessel can be a hedge against short-term fluctua-
tions in trades (Branch, 1982).
Vessels are designed for certain trades, but standardized
designs are accepted when the costs involved in designinq and
building th.e vessel become excessive. The process involved in
weighing the myriad of factors involved and producing the per-
fect ~hip for a trade is a science in itself, and a major subset
of maritime economics.
The ships themselves are merely vehicles in marine trans-
portation. Procurement of cargo is the primary consideration.
In order to effectively capture cargo, a shipowner must create
a schedule for his given on a given route.
Branch (1982) gives twenty factors to consider in planning
these schedules, includinq:
1. Number of vessels employed.
2. Types of vessels.
3. Volume and type of cargo tLaffic.
4. Seasonal traffic fluctuations.
5. Availability of crews.
6. Climatic conditions.
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7. Competition within a trade.
8. Availability and reliability of labor and
port facilities.
9. Time involved in cargo cperations.
10. Voyage time between ports.
11. Potential hostilities which may cause re-
routing.
12. Imbalances of trade flows.
13. Potential traffic growth.
14. Necessary time for dry docking and surveys.
15. Fuel requirements.
Efficient ship scheduling requires continuous monitorinq
of market conditions and various costs involved in a trade.
A shipowner must also have plans for emergencies or changes
in a trade.
The four key elements of any shipping o~eration are:
1. Speed of service.
2. Frequency of service.
3. Reliability of service.
4. Cost of service (Branc~, 1982).
It would appear that costs of service would predominate
over the other factors. This is not necessarily true in all
cases. The value of a commodity beinq shipped is a pri~e .con-
sideration as to the service a shipper selectes. Shippers of
high value item~ may place more emphasis on speed or frequency,
whereas shippers of lesser value items would tend to emphasize
6
cost of service. This occurs for several reasons, hiqher
value items incur greater inventory costs, so a speedier
service may reduce these costs. Shipping costs of low value
items are usually a greater percentage of the landed costs,
thus the emphasis would be towards a lower cost service. De-
pendent upon his production schedule, a shipper will choose
the line which. offers a frequency of service which will best
suit his needs, whether it be weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly.
Reliability and reputation can also have a major impact on
the choice of a shipping operation.
All shipowners must contend with the same basic types of
operating expenses. The percentage that each factor contri-
butes to overall operating costs can vary widely, depending
upon the type of shipping operation. A common definition of
operating costs has yet to be established, and there is a
variety of different breakdowns (Heaver, 1985) which suit
different shipping operations. The focus here will be on liner
operations, the cost structures of which ~ill differ consider-
ably from those of bulk operations.
The first type of costs to be considered are voyage costs.
These are costs which. are incurred as a direct result of the
particular voyage being accounted for. These costs are related
to the length of sea transit and the parti.cular ports called at.
Examples of voyage costs include expenses for fuel, port and
canal charges, and carao handling.
The next type of costs are those which can be considered
as unrelated to a particular voyage, but, vary little with
any particular route. These costs include those for crew,
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supplies, insurance, maintenance, and repairs, and admini-
stration. Capital costs are those which are associated with.
the ownership of a vessel.
The definitions o f operating costs vary from one of the
total costs of the shipping operation to one where both
voyage costs and capital costs are deducted from total costs.
The latter is the most commonly used, and this provides for a
breakdown of total costs into operating, voyage and capital
costs (Heaver, 1985).
Another classification which. is used to di fferentiate
ship's costs is that between fixed and variable costs. It
has been said that a troubled shipping line will continue to
operate as long as variable costs are covered, and some con-
tribution can be made to fixed costs. In a liner service such
as the Round-the-World Service (RWS) t.o be examined, many of
the costs which can be considered variable are indeed more of
a fixed nature which points to a serious flaw in this cos·t
differentiation. For various reasons the breakdown used in
this analysis will be that given by Frankel (1982) which
utilizes the fixed/variable approach. Chief among these rea-
sons is the fact that the service is' not fully developed and
changes could cause alteration of costs considered variable.
A secondary reason is the fact that capital costs will be on
the mind of the operator, as a tremendous debt burden ~as
been incurred. Debt service may indeed have a major impact
on operating strategy, and thus, operating costs, nnd because
of this the separation between operating, v~yage, and capital
costs was not deemed necessary.
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The following breakdown of operating expenses will be
used in this study (Frankel, 1982):
FIXED COSTS
1. Financing.
2. Crew and Manning.
3. Insurance - Hull, P & I.
4 . Administration.
5. Overhead.
VARIABLE COSTS
In Port
1. Fuel and Lube Oil.
2. Maintenance and Repair.
3. Port Dues and Canal Costs.
4. Supplies.
5. Cargo Handling.
At Sea
1. Fuel and Lube Oil.
2. Maintenance and Repair.
3. Supplies.
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Shipowners must also conform to standards set by
certain organizations which may effect the cost of operatinq
their vessels. In the liner trades, shipowners form cartels
called conferences in which freight trades and sailing
schedules are regulated to benefit all members. The Inter-
national Maritime Organization (IMO) sets standards for ship
construction. The International Labor Organization (ILO)
sets standards for quality and care of shipboard personnel.
The field of maritime economics is broad, and the shipping
business is multi-faceted and dynamic. The efficient ship-
owner must have a firm grasp of all factors which could effect
his operations. Considering the international nature :o f the
business, events thousands of miles away can make or break a
shipping operation. National po:icies and conference practices
can also determine the success or failure of a service. Errors
in ship design, scheduling, or marketing could po~entially
cause a shipping line to lose profitability.
The Development of Containerization
Liner shipping is performed for the carriaqe of mostly
high value., finished goods. This can be differentiated from
bulk shipping, in which shipload lots of homogenous, lower
value cargo is carried.
Liner services require an extensive sh.oreside support
staff, and provide 's h i ppe r s with regularly scheduled sailings
at frequent intervals. A major economic element in liner
shipping is termed "cross subsidization". As freight rates
, "
are a proportion of the landed cost of an item in interna-
tional trade, the rate would naturally be a higher proportion
of the cost of a low valued item versus a higher valued item
over the same trade route. As a result, shipowners charge
"what the traffic can bear", with higher valued items charged
a higher rate.
In effect, the high value items subsidize the movement
of low value items in order to keep the low value items flowincr.
This results in higher load factors (pe~centage of vessel
utilization). Shipowners involved in multiple trade routes
also cross-subsidize lower revenue earning routes with profits
earned from higher revenue routes.
Liner shipping waS revolutionized in the late 1950s,
with the advent of containerization. Prior to containerizat.i.on,
goods were carried in small lots which were care tully stowed in
holds of ships by longshoremen. This method (break-bulk) was
both labor and time intense. Ships spent up to 60 percent of
their lives in port (Goss, 1967).
The maximum size of vessels using the break-bulk method
was governed by the need to reduce the turn-around time as
much as pos:ible. Ships do not earn revenues while sitting in
port. A smaller vessel is able to turn-around in port much
faster than a larger vessel. Economies of scale were overcome
by the need to reduce the turn-around time.
In t . he late 1950s an American trucking magnate, Malcolm
McLean established a liner shipping service between New York
and Texas which proved to be a model for 2. wo r Ld:..ci.de transporta-
tion network. McLean stowed cargo in boxes which fit onto truck
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trailers. Their easy removal allowed cargo to be carried at
sea, or on land without bulk breakage. Since the loads were
of homogenous size, loading and offloading was facilitated.
The larger weight per lift enabled container vessels to
drastically reduce their turn-around time in port, enabling
larger ships to be economically employed. Any additional fuel
costs incurred by the higher operating speeds were justified
by the increased efficiency of port operations.
Containerization requires large amounts of capital input,
which is a main reason for shipowners in liner shipping not
immediately embracing it. To combat this capital intensive-
ness, shipowners formed consortia to divide the costs amon~
several countries/companies.
The Atlantic Container Line CACL) was formed in 1967 with
Swedish, Dutch, French and English partners. This consortium
was formed in direct response to the introduction of containerized
service on the North Atlantic route in 1966 by the three American
lines of Moore McCormack, U.S. Lines, and Sea-Land (Kendall, 1983).
The first containerships were break-bulk vessels which had
been converted to carry containers on deck. As containerization
became more widely accepted, purpose-built containerships were
constructed. These vessels feature cellular guides to place the
containers in, and facilities to securely store the containers.
In order to utilize economies of scale, these vessels were
larger and faster than break-bulk vessels. The oil crisis of
1973 caused shipowners to examine fuel costs. Reduced speeds and
replacement of stearn turbines with diesels increased fuel
efficiency.
, ...
Ships such as the 26 knot, Sea Land SL-7, became too
costly to operate efficiently. The subsidized u.s. carriers
were handicapped by this conversion to diesel, as the U.S.
Navy required a certain design speed be incorporated into sub-
sidized vessels. As a result, American operators were placed
at a disadvantage, as compared to their European and Japanese
counterparts.
Containerization has manifested itself in other ways.
Besides the growth in number and size of full containerships,
additional innovations included the semi-containership, the
roll-on/roll-off, and the container/bulk ship.
The semi-container ship is designed to carry break-bulk
as well as container cargo. The roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) carries
the container, as well as the chassis, and features faster un-
loading than the full containerships. The container/bulk ships
are full containerships with strengthened hulls, allowing the
carriage of bulk cargoes.
There are also hybrid combinations of these basic types,
and other carriers which compete with full containerships for
cargo. The percentage of these types of vessels is growing
annually.
In 1981, the percentage of world containership fleet for
these basic types totalled 56 percent (CSR, 1984), and consisted
of:
1.
2.
3.
Semi-container
Roll-on/roll-off
Container/bulk
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32 percent
18 percent
6 percent
In addition to other types of vessels, full containership
operators must compete 'with land modes of transportation due to
the intermodal nature of containerization.
The Trans-Siberian Railroad offers competition in the
Europe/Far East trade, and has captured an estimated 20 percent
of cargoes flowing from the Far East to Europe (Seatrade,
1985 bl. Landbridge operationsfrom the Far East to Europe and
the East Coast of Nort~ America ' (and vice-a-versa) have secured
a market share competing with all-water carriers.
World containerized traffic increased over 600 percent be-
tween 1970 and 1982 (CSR, 1984). This growth was primarily re-
corded on three major trade routes:
1. North, Atlantic/Europe
2. Europe/Far East
3. North America/Far East
Given its capital intensiveness, many third world trades
were not balanced or large enough to warrant containerization.
Many of these trades are now in the process of being containerized.
One manifestation of the capital intensiveness of contain-
erization was the concentration of vessels among a few carriers.
In 1980, twenty carriers owned 60 percent of the world fleet. In
1981, 73 percent of the total slot capacity could be attributed
to carriers from Western Europe, Far East and North America (Pear-
son and Fossey, 1984).
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Regardless of the fact that certain developing nations
have recorded increases in containerized traffic, the main
impetus for container growth has remained with developed and
emerging developed nations. Considering the current surplus
of vessels, and the ability to lease containers, the capital
intensiveness of containerized shipping is decreasing, and
market entry has been facilitated. This will lead to major
changes in the geographic distribution of containerized traffic,
as well as ownership of the world's container fleet (Pearson and
Possey, 1984). Despite the aforementioned financial restrictions
placed upon containership operations, the world market is cur-
rently overtonnaged, especially in the North/North trades.
Containerization International Yearbook 1984 places the
world fleet at 2,961 ships with a capacity of 1.75 million TEU.
Ships on order aggregated another 330,000 TEU, to be delivered
by 1986. These new slots will aggravate a market already over-
tonnaged by up to 30 percent. Other forecasts are considerably
higher; one estimate as muc~ as 2.4 million TEU by 1986 (CSR,
1984).
Nearly one third of the TEU slots on order in 1984 were
the result of orders by two operators, the American carrier
u.S. Lines, and the Taiwanese carrier Evergreen Lines. In a
time when there is existing overcapacity, and the growth of manu-
factured goods is expected to increase only 4.6 percent per annum,
one can only wonder where the cargo to fill these massive orders
will come from (Containerization International, 1985) .
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Protectionism in Shipping
It has been stated that the "megatrend" in inter-
national maritime policy is the politicization of formerly
private decisions and commercial accomodations (Schrier, 1985).
This politicization can take many forms, and there seems to be
no common definition· of protectionism which is accepted on a
global basis. The driving forces behind this wave of pro-
tectionist actions in the maritime world are the general re-
cession worldwide, and the desire of many nations to establish
or expand their merchant fleets (Totland, 1980).
Protectionism can be broadly defined as reduction- of
competition through non-market forces to favor national interests.
Protectionism can be categorized into three general categories:
1. unilateral cargo reservation and flag preference
2. bilateral division and allocation of cargo
3. multilateral cargo sharing schemes
Many nations, including the United States, practice cargo
reservation of government-impelled cargoes. Bilateral agree-
ments between nations are proliferatinq worldwide, whether they
are governmental or commercial in nature. An example of a nulti-
lateral sharing scheme is the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNC'!'AD) Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences
which came into force in October of 1983.
The UNCTAD Liner Code evolved from the desire of developing
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countries to form a "New International Maritime Order" (Bohme,
19841. Developing nations sought to:
1. Kave a substantial and increased share in the
carriage of oceanborne cargoes and a corresponding
portion of the world fleet.
2. Form their national fleets on the grounds of sound
economic principles and equity.
In 1970, the developing nations accounted for approximately
17 percent of world trade, but, only slightly more th.an 6 percent
of world tonnage (UNCTAD, 1982). Besides the ineqity in the num-
ber of vessels, the developing nations were hampered by the
difficulties experienced in gaining entry into closed liner
conferences serving their trades (Juda, 1981). Liner conferences
are defined as organizations of international liner carriers
that collectively agree on routes, schedules, rates, and other
aspects of liner services (Office of Technology Assessment, 1983).
Since conferences were in existence prior to the emergence of
the Third World, they were viewed as a vestige of colonialism.
Developing countries also felt they had no control over freight
costs, and their inability to ensure cargoes made financing a
fleet a difficult proposition (Juda, 1981 ). In response to these
difficulties, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develo~-
ment (UNCTAD) adopted a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences
in 1974. Basic provisions of the UNCTAD Code include:
1. The right of national flag lines to enter
conferences serving their trades.
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2. Cargo sharing through tonnage/revenue
pooling, or sailing agreements.
3. Dispute resolution mechanisms.
4. Conference decision making and consultation.
5. Freight rate determination.
6. Procedures for grant of membership.
The focus here will be on Article 2.4 of the Code which
states:
a) The national flag lines in ~ trade shall each
carry an equal proportion of their mutual
conference trade.
b) Third-country shipping lines shall have the
right to acquire a significant part such as
20 percent in the freight and volume of. traffic
generated in that trade.
These provisions have become known widely as the 40-40-20
clause, the numbers representing the respective shares of a
trade given to the national flag lines in a trade and third-
flag carriers, which are named crosstraders.
By January, 1984, fifty-nine nations had ratified the Code.
The European Economic Community (EEC) has become signatory to
the Code with a set of reservations dubbed the "Brussels Package"
(EEC Regulation 954/79), which exempts cargo carried between
EEC members, and also between reciprocating members of the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
from the cargo sharing provisions of the Code. It is postulated
that the combination of viable nonconference carriers and the
Brussels Package has left only 5 to 10 percent of the world's
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liner cargo under the auspices of the Code (Odeke, 1984).
Many nations nave been disinclined to make the Code operative.
Other~problems which implementation of the Code faces include:
1. Non-acceptance by major trading nations,
such as the United States, Australia and
Brazil.
2. Lack of provisions for administration.
3. The questionable legal status of Conferences
if governments police the Code (Sturmey, 1984).
4. Questions of status of transshipment cargo, as
well as undirectional servic€s such as Round-
the-World Service (Frankel, et aI, 1981).
5. If developing nations take measure more re-
strictive than the Code, such as applying it
to all liner cargo, (excluding independents),
or bulk cargoes, it will tend to make the Code
irrelevant dependent upon the interpretation
of the Code (Odeke, 1984).
Comments on the Code in the developed countries have
ranged from "a license for protectionism" to "aodifying the
best conference principle" (Schrier, 1985 and Sturmey, 1984).
Such polarization will lead to problems in implementation, but
the Code will not just go away. It has legitimized existing
political impediments, and it will change the traditional con-
ference structures to a yet to be seen form, .i.f it is implemented.
The vexing problem of the role of government regulation under
the Code will undermine its implementation in its present form.
One of the strengths of the Code is that it can be radically
altered after five years, which will occur in 1988. The Code
will have to deal with current practices of certain nations,
which are either different from, or in opposition to, the pro-
visions and spirit of the Code. Another issue which must be
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dealt with is the fact that conference practice has changed
since the Code was drafted, therefore, the Code will have to
be changed to reflect cur nt conference practice (Container-
ization International Yearbook, 1984). The review conference
in 1998 may well determine whether or not an international
instrument, such as the Code, will have much relevance in he
future of liner shipping.
Another form of political impediment s unilateral
protectionist actions taken by gove :nments to aid the ir nat~on-
al fleets. These include:
1. Cargo preferenc of certain commodities or
government impelled cargoes.
2 . Flag preference again foreign vessels
a. currency exchange control
b. preferential c lauses in : r a de agr e . _ .3
c. import and export licensinq syste
d. port regulations and berth prefe r c e
e. taxation measures.
3. Other practices incl ude:
a. heavy fines for minor offenses
b. imposition of heavy port dues in response
to freight increases
c. discrimination against non-national, multi-
modal operators
d. r =f us a l of transshipment
e. requiring lines to obtain "associat~ line
status'
f. discriminatory government purchasing (OECD,
1983) .
If a multilateral or bilateral scheme is not adopted
by the nations in a trade, especially trades between developed
and developing nations (LDCs), it seems almost certain that
these LDCs would impose any measures needed to ensure the
growth or development of their merchant fleets; if they were
indeed intent on developing a national shippinq industry. The
danger to world shipping would seem to be greater if each of a
multitude of nations were given free rein to impose an~ of a
long list of impediments to foreign flag carriers.
Of increasing importance are commercial impediments;
those which appear to be comn~erclal in nature. The distinction
between commercial and government impediments is becoming
increasingly blurred (American Shipper, 1985). Commercial pro-
tectionism includes:
1. Shipping associations which favor national
carriers.
2. The requirement of certain governments to
hire local agents, and pay them a minimum
commission.
3. Cargo booking offices and freight bureaus
which favor national carriers.
4. Agreements between national shipping lines,
which lock up mutual trade between two nations.
5. Closed conferences which exclude outsiders.
6. Other impediments such as letters of credit
which specify certain lines, increased paper-
work, burden on non-national carriers, etc.
(Manalytics, 1984, Vol. 3).
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Most commercial impediments can be seen as a replacement
for direct Government impediments, as the Government plays a
major role in the conduct of nations practicing these impedi-
ments (Manalytics, 1984, Vol. 3).
The final type of impediments which a crosstrader may
face is bilateral agreements. These agreements can serve to
lock up cargo between two nations, or group of nations, so
that a third flag line is effectively blocked. Many of the
agreements in force are 50/50, with each principal carrying
50 percent of their.mutual trade. Since these are government-
al actions, and do no~ lie within the conference structure,
a third flag line can only appeal to its own government when
blocked from a trade. Given the imbalanced nature of many
trades, and the flexibility of multi-national port calls at
each end of given trade routes, it has been stated that multi-
lateralism is preferable to bilateralism in many cases, as the
latter may cause routing efficiences. The UNCTAD Code provides
for regional cargo-sharing schemes.
Cargo-sharing, as a whole, may lead to increased parti-
cipation of Governments, due to the need to regulate cargo-
sharing pools (Sturmey, 1984). Totland (1980) has stated that
cargo preference will result in lack of innovation, and in-
creased freight rates in the long run.
Protectionism is on the rise, and nations espousing free-
trade, such as the United States, must 'de ve l o p policy responses
to combat this growing trend, integrating national security,
foreign relations, and domestic aspects.
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Development of U.S. Maritime Policy
The Shipping Act of 1916 marked the commencement of
U.S. Government regulation of the liner shipping industry.
The Act created the U.S. Shipping Board, investing in the
Board the duty of encouraging the U.S. flag merchant marine.
The Act made certain practices illegal, such as the use of
"fighting ships" and deferred rebates by liner conferences.
Discrimination against American shippers was also made
illegal. Section 14(a) of the Act (46 U.S.C. 813) ~ave the
Board the power to retaliate against foreign nationals found
in violation of the Act. The prescribed penalty for foreign
nationals in violation of the Act was to deny their vessels
entrance to U.S. ports (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983).
During the course of World War I, the U.S. merchant
marine grew from a nominal to a huge fleet of over 1,750 ships.
The principle objectives of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920
were the disposition of this fleet, and to expand the function
of the Shipping Board (Frankel, 1982). This expanded function
was to create rules and regulations, in addition to enforcing
existing laws.
Section 19(b)(46 U.S.C. 876) of the Act reads as follows:
The Board is authorized to make rules affecting
shipping in the foreign trades, not in conflict
with law and order, to adjust or meet general or
special conditions unfavorable to shipping in the
foreign trade.
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Conditions warranting a Section 19 ,proceeding are any
foreign laws, regulations or anticompetitive methods employed
by foreign nationals which discriminate against carriers in
u.S. trade. The law also gave the Board the right to request
other government agencies to change or revise rules affecting
shipping, and a Presidential review, if conflicts arose in
that context (u.S. Government Printing Office, 1983).
Both the 1916 Shipping Act and the 1920 Merchant Marine
Act enunciated the need for a merchant marine. The Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 went further than the previous acts, speci-
fying how the merchant marine would be promoted.
The Act introduced the essential trade route and subsidy
systems which would form the cornerstone of U.S. promotional
policies. The U.S. Shipping Act Board was abolished and re-
placed with the U.S. Maritime Commission. The Commission was
charged with promotional programs, as well as the regulatory
functions of the Shipping Bo~rd.
In addition to the powers granted in Section 14 of the
1916 Act, and Section 19 of the 1920 Act, the Commission was
directed to investigate any discriminatory actions in foreign
trade, and recommend legislation to correct the situation under
46 U.S.C. 1122 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983).
The U.S. Maritime Commission was in existence throughout
World War II, which saw a rapid growth of the U.S. Merchant
Marine. Under Reorganization Plan 21 (75 STAT. 203) of 1950,
the U.S. Maritime Commission was abolished and replaced by the
Federal Maritime Board in the Department of Commerce (U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1983).
In 1961, the Federal Maritime Board was abolished in
Reorganization Plan 7 (75 Stat. 840) '. The r egu l a to ry functions
of the Board were transferred to the Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC), an independent regulatory agency. The Commission consists
of five commissioners, who are appointed by the President; and a
Chairman , who is appointed from one of the five commissioners
(U .S. Government Printing Office, 1983).
The FMC inherited Section 14 and Section 19 powers to protect
carriers in the U.S. trades. As U.S. carriers adopted new routing
strategies (given containerization), more opportunities for cross-
trading were created. The question arose as to the applicability
of Section 19 and Section 14 to non-U.S. trades (Senate Report ~8-J).
Section 19 is applicable "in the foreign trade", but is silent as
to trades between foreign ports (U.S. Government Printing Office ,
1983) .
Section 14 is applicable in the foreign to foreign trades;
however, it has the stipulation that the foreign nationals have
committed one of a list of prohibited acts (Senate Report ~8-3) .
This did not give the FMC much leeway in the event impediments
existed, yet did not fall within the range of prohibited acts.
In hearings before the House ~erchant Karine and Fisheries
Committee on the Shipping Act of 1983 (H.R. 1878), Albert ~ay,
Vice President of the Council of American Flag Ship Operators,
(CASO) requested an amendment to the bill authorizing the F~C
to suspend tarriffs of foreign carriers unduly impairing access
of a U.S. carrier trade between foreign ports (House of Repre-
sentatives Hearings, March, 1983).
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I n a 1 cture at t e U _ v er s~ t y f Rhode Island, Gerald
Siefe r . , Counsel of ch e 10 se Merch .nt Marine and Fisheries
Committee, stated that in response to requests by United
States Diplomats negotiating with Consultative Shipping Group
(C.S .. ), Article 13(b)(5) was added to bill H.R. 1878, wh~ch
eventually became the Shipping Act of 1984.
The C.S.G. is composed of European and Japanese interests.
Talks have centered on the C.S.G. adoption of the UNCTAD Liner
Code, as well as United States access to closed ccnferences in
European and Japanese trades. As it echoes of retaliation for
any acts Which 9r e v e n t U.S. carriers from crosstrading, it was
felt that Article 13(b)(5) would provide the Un i t e d States wi th
a stronger position in these talks. Article 13(b)(5) of the
Shipping Act of 1984 reads:
If, after notice and hearing, the Commission
finds that the action of a common carrier,
acting alone or in concert with any person,
or a foreign government. has unduly impaired
access of a vessel documented under the laws
of the United States to t r a d e between forei~n
ports, the Commission shall take action a " it
finds appropriate. " , (98 Stat. 83, Section"
13(b)(5).
Appropriate ac~ion includes the suspension of tariffs
which are required for a foreign operator to operate in U.S .
trade. If the foreign carrier wishes to continue working in
the United States cr a d e s , it is necessary to file new tariffs
naming o n l y home ports. This effectively bars foreign carr~ers
from crosstrading in the U.S. trades.
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Article 1 3 (b ) (5' has been termed a reactive rather
than active response, whereby impediments to u.s. cross-
trading would be met by the termination of crosstrading
opportunities in u.s. trades (Schrier, 1984).
The final rules implementing Article 13(b)(5). state
conditions for "unduly impaired" are found only where a
u.S. flag carrier is commercially able to enter a trade.
Conditions in which a judgement of "unduly impaired access"
is required include:
1. Imposition upon u.S. flag vessels or
shippers of fees, charges, or restrictions
different from those iMposed upon national
flag carriers or other carriers.
2. Reservation of a subs ~antial pc~:ion of
the total cargo in a trade to national flag,
or other lines, without providing u.S. flag
carriers competitive access.
3. Use of predatory practices including closed
conferences employing fighting shi :.'S or de-
ferred rebates.
4. Any other Government or coromerc al action
which unduly impairs access to ~os s ~=ade
cargoes (U.S. Government Printing Of~ice, 1984).
When a u.S. flag carrier has exhausted all commercial
remedies available, a petition can be filed with the Federal
Maritime Commission (FMC) under Section 13. If the FMC finds
indications of conditions unduly impairing access to cross-
trade cargoes, a proceeding will be instituted; with the
commencement published in the Federal Register.
After gathering information from all interested parties,
the FMC may conduct hearings before rendering judgment . If
the judgment affirms the petition of the affected carrier,
the FMC is directed ~o notify the Secretary of Stat~; request-
ing that the State Department resolve the matter through diplo-
matic channels. If not accomplished within a specified period
of time, the FMC may order sanctions against foreign carriers,
or any national flag line, of the nation responsible for the
impediment. These sanctions include:
1. Imposition of equalizing fees or charges.
2. Cargo limitations on cargo carried to, or
sailing from U.S. ports.
3. Tariff suspension, with fines up to $30,~00
per shipment for violation of suspensions.
4. Any other action the Commission considers
appropriate.
Notice of the decision is then published in the Federal
Register; and, si.nultaneous:y, is submitted to the President,
for approval. Within ten days, the President may disaprove
the action because of national security or considerations of
foreign policy. Thus, the machinery is in place for the
United States to respond to political and commercial impediments,
thereby preserving the crosstrading rights of U.S . carriers.
Section 13(b)(5) will be an effective deterrent to
impediments of nations which are major crosstraders in our
trades. However, Section 13 is just one ot many potential
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?o l i c y responses to protectioaist actions of foreign nations.
Should responses in the maritime sector fail to produce the
desired results, non-maritime policy responses may be invoked
Pos ble Governmental responses to political impediments are:
1. Formal protest.
2. Tariff suspension under Section 13(b)(5}.
3. Port closure under Section 14(a)(2) of the
Shipping Act of 1916.
4. Cargo reservation by executive order.
5. Imposition of operating restrictions.
6. Increased taxes or currency control by
executive order.
n maritime responses which can be invoked' include:
1. increased duties (Tariff Act of 1930),
2. trade restrictions (various Acts).
3. alteration of economic or military aid.
4. abrogation of treaties (Manalytics, 1984).
The enforcers of U.S. maritime policy have considerable
clout and many tools to work wit~. However, they are handi-
capped by the fact that shipping is a small part of the total
economic and geopolitical considerations in U.S. foreign
economic and commercial policy.
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In view of that. it i~
evident that, when sanctions are being considered, a host
of other government agencies will be involved in the process
of making decisions. Many will have vested interestsin the
foreign nation o~ nations involved. Opposition by one or
more of these agencies may handcuff the TI1C in its ability
to keep crosstrades open.
Other major actors in the foreign policy process are:
1. Department of State.
2. Department of Defense.
3. Department of Transportation.
4 . Department of Agriculture.
5. Department of Commerce.
6. Export-Import Bank.
7. Office of the Trade Representative.
8. Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
9. International Deve~opment and Cooperation
Agency.
10. Agency for International Development.
As evidenced in the informatio~ provided above , the FMC
will have to exert considerable influence on the domestic front,
before any influence is 'e xe r t e d in the international sphere.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
Developing the Service
united States Lines is probably best remembered for
their passenger ship operations which included the super-
liner S.S. United States, holder of the blue ribband for
fastest transatlantic crossing. United States Lines was
also a pioneer in the transatlantic container trade, com-
mencing the carriage of containers on the deck of four
br.eakbulk vessels in March 1966 (Kendall, 1983).
In 1974, United States Lines was purchased by ~alcolm
McLean, pioneer of containerization and founder of Sea-Land
Corporation. McLean inherited a fleet of vessels which were
too small for the routes· they were involved in, as well as
being fuel-inefficient steam-turbine vessels. High manning
scales also caused the line's inability to compete with
foreign operators and more efficient American operators.
McLean had an idea to revolutionize the container busi-
ness by introducing greater economies of scale than those
being used. The theoretical maximum size of a container
vessel was considered in the range of 5,000 TEU. However,
in 1978, the average size of fully cellular container vessels
was 842 TEU (Pearson and Fossey, 1984).
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McLean employed C. R. Cushing Company to design
panamax, (~aximum dimensions to fit through the Panama
Canal) containerships to run in an around-the-world
itinerary. At the time, containerships were growing in
size~ the Hapag Lloyd vessel, Frankfurt Express, held the
lead with 3,045 TEU (American Bureau of Shipping, 1984).
McLean's idea went beyond that, and plans were drawn for
a 4,400 TEU vessel.
The proposed itinerary for this fleet of superships
was also a first in container circles. The idea of. an
around-the-world service was not a new one. Several lines,
notably American Export Lines, ran break-bulk vessels
around the world successfully. Barber Blue Sea and several
other operators ran semi-container and roll-on/roll-of£ (RO/RO)
operations worldwide. Never before had anyone run a fully
cellular container vessel on a worldwide itinerary.
Before his dream would come to fruition, McLean would
face many obstacles, the first of which was the Maritime
Administration U1ARAD). In order to initiate the new service
it was necessary to buyout of the operating differential sub-
sidy to enable the line to charter foreign flaq feeder services.
It is stated in Section 804(A) of the Merchant Marine Act of.
t
1936 that it is illegal for a subsidized u.S. carrier to operate
or charter foreign flag tonnage which competes with any essen-
tial u.S. flag service (Government P'ri.rrt Ln-; Office, 1983).
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The money obtained from the buyout also assisted
in McLean's financing of his new vessels. In June 1982,
MARAD approved the buyout of a U.S. Lines lon~-term sub-
sidy, in return for a cash settlement and a five year short-
term subsidy on vessels not involved in Round-the-World
Services (RWS). In October 1984, ~ARAD approv~d the request
for foreign feeder vessels for a period of two years. Both
the subsidy buyout and the foreign flag feeders are being
challenged by various United States maritime interests on
the grounds that the MARAD decisions will adversely affect
their interests (Seatrade,1985a)-.
Another obstacle McLean faced was gaining peL~ission
to build his ships abroad. Permission was "received in 1983,
as the Government granted a twelve month waiver for United
States-flag subsi~ized carriers to build their vessels abroad.
An order was placed with Daewoo Shipyard in South Korea for
twelve "Econships" (named by the designer) which U.S. Lines
will call the "New York Class".
The $570 million contract was the larqest shipbuilding
order in history. In order to finance this staqqering amount,
McLean obtained 80 percent of the required financing from the
shipyard over a ten year reriod. Other lenders, most notably
.~erican Express and General Electric, provided fundinq for
down payments over a twelve year period. U.S. Lines established
a $10 million account for each ship and agreed to maintain
certain financial obligations (American Shipper,. 1984) .
During this sa~e period of time, in addition to developing his
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RWS, McLean made two other major acquisitions. In January
1983, U.S. Lines acquired Moore McCormack, operating thirteen
vessels running to the East Coast of South America. Moore
McCormack was renamed U.S. Lines S.A., and in late 1984,
Delta Steamship Lines was acquired. Delta Lines ran eleven
vessels operating in the East and West Coasts of South
American and South African trades. Pze s urnc..bLy , once South
American trades have been containerized, cargo will be fed
into the RWS at Panama.
In mid-1984, the first vessel, "American New York" ~as
launched. This initiated the larqest peacetime expansion of
the U.S. Merchant Marine in United States history. U.S. Lines
Chairman, William Bru, called it a "new era in American ship-
ping". If succp.ssful, this new service, along with another
RWS initiated by Evergreen Lines of Taiwan, could upset
traditional notions of maritime economics, and force the
departure of many inefficient lines from the world shipping
communi ty (Sagar, 1985).
The Econships
Malcolm McLean souqht to expand his oriqinal idea,
which had taken the world bv storm. Containerships continued
to make multi-port calls at each end of a trade route, rather
than only servicing major ports. Secondary ports were still
serviced by mainline vessels. The idea of "load centers" had
not occure~ for several reasons. McLean's idea was to intro-
duce the largest ships with economical power plants and re-
duced manning to run "the cheapest container slot".
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McLean presented his idea to C. R. Cushing Company
of New York, and plans were made for the Econships. The
size of the vessels was constrained by the size of the
Panama Canal. They are nine hundred fifty feet in overall
length, with. a beam of one hundred six feet, and a summer
draft of thirty five feet. They are rated at 4,200 TEU,
however, on her maiden voyage the American New York carried
4,400 TEU. Figure 1 shows the dimensions and capacities of
the Econships·.
The ve s se Ls are virtually rectangular above the water-
line. Below the waterline they are fine to allow greater
fuel economy. The beam is the same at the stern as to mid-
ships. The seventy foot depth gives the vessel a very high
freeboard. Other features built into the vessel are lack of
flared bow and minimum dead rise from the keel to the bilge
stroke. This minimizes dry-docking and repair complications.
The ratio of length to beam is nine to one, compared to
an average ratio for most panamax vessels of approximately
seven to one. There are two large box girders running the
length of the vessel, which allow increased lonqtitudinal
strength and provide the crew with access to the bow by acting
as rassageways.
Econships are powered by a Sulzer two-stroke diesel
producing 28,000 horsepower and driving a 7.6 meter diameter
five-bladed propeller. Service speed of these vessels is
eighteen knots, and they are expected to burn approximately
seventy three tons of fuel per day. The fuel capacity is
fifty six hundred tons enabling the vessels to circle the
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FIGURE 1
•
American New York
American Maine
The "NEW YORK CLASS" Full Container Ships
Christening May 31. 1984
• American New Jersey
American Alabama
Outline of v :
These v are singl. screw, singl. rudder, dl....prop.lled with fcl. deck and bulbou. bow. Th. engine room and
accommOdations are located aft. Th. design is principally tor carrying ISO type. torty-toot long. cargo containers.
Prtnet.. Partlcutars:
a) ...... DIIMMIon.:
Length overall: 289.500 M/950 ft.
Beam (Panamax): 32.218 M/ 10e ft.
DeQth: 21.500 M/ 70' 8"
Draft: 10.870 M/ 35 ft.
b) Dadweight and Tonn~:
DWT at scantling draft 57.800 metric tons
Gross tonnage 52.000 memc ton.
Net ton nag. 18.700 metric tons
C) C~
eom.t....: in hold. 1232 FEU (torty-toot equival.nt units)
on deck. 996 FEU
Total 2228 FEU
Includ. capacity tor 146 FEU refrigerated units on deck.
Sr••bulk capacity: 102,500 cu ft.
Particularly suitabl. for heavy lift roiling stock.
d) Speed -Crut.tng Range:
These vessels will carry sufficient fu.1 to cruise 30.000 nautical mil.s at 18 knots.
e) Main engine:
MOdelSulzer 7RLB90, Slow speed diesel
Horsepower: 28.000
f) S41fety F••turn:
• Contam.rs are secured by " Peck and Hale", ridged rod With locking stacker lashing system.
• Longsnoreman catwalks provided throughout the structure.
• U.S. Coast Guard Safety Regulations applicable.
• Class: ABS. + A1,~+ AMS. + ACCU.
g) GuJdancel Nnigatloftl Communication Equtpment
• SATNAV Satelite guidance system.
• Loran/Decca electronic navigation syst.m.
• Sperry autopilot SAP 2000-Steering control and autopilot. and hydraulic backup syst.ms.
• Sperry radar plant (Short and long range) including collision avoidance systems.
• Satellite communication system allOWingcontact by telex or vOIce to any office or ship in the world.
Source: MARAn
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globe without bunkering (Marine Engineering Log, 1984).
Tw~~ty cne crewmen operate the vessels, including:
1. One Master.
2. Three Deck Officers.
3. Chief Engineer and Three Assistant Engineers.
4. One Radio Officer.
5. Six Seamen.
6. Two Engine ~echanics.
7. One Wiper.
8. Three Stewards.
This represents a considerable reduction in crew over
former u.S. Lines vessels which carried a crew of thirty nine.
The vessels are American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) classified,
and represent the state of the art in containership design
(American Bureau of Shipping, 1984).
The Route
u.S. Lines has been extremely secretive in the develop-
ment of the ~Sea Bridge~ service. A proposed itinerary is
presented in Table 1, along with distances and transit times.
Figure 2 shows the route on a world map. Table 2 depicts the
feeder service distances. The service began in December 1984.
The interim service deletes the Northern Europe port as well
as port calls in the Persian Gulf, and Balboa, Panama.
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ROU'l'E OF THE ROUND-'l'HE-WORLD SERVICE
Source: Various Trade Journaln
Table 1
ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICES
DISTANCE AND TRANSIT TIMES
DISTANCE
ULM. )
TRANS IT TIMES
(Days)
New York - Rotterdam 3,484 7.0
Rotterdam - Marseilles - FOS 2,153 5.0
Marseilles - FOS - Jeddah 2,240 5.2
Jeddah - Khor Fakkan, UAE 2,578 6.0
Khor Fakkan - Singapore 3,200 7.4
Singapore - Hong Kong 1,454 3.4
Hong Kong - Kaoshsiung 341 .8
Kaoshsiung - Kobe 1.075 2.5
Kobe - Yokohama 357 .8
Yokohama - Panama 7,682 17.8
Panama - Savannah 1,606 3.7
Savannah - New York 634 1.5
TOTALS 26,774 61. 1
Sources: U.S. Navy Oceanographic Office
Distances Between Ports. 1965
Author's Calculations (Utilizing Mercator Method)
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TA.BLE 2
PROPOSED FEEDER SERVICE DISTANCES
LINE HAUL PORT/VESSEL
Rotterdam:
1 - 110 T.E.U.
2 - 175 T.E.U.
3 - 450 T. E.U•
Marsei 11 es/Fl}i
1 - 175 T.E.U.
Khor Fakkan, UAE
2 - 275 T.E.U.
2 - 225 T.E.U.
Singapore
3 - 225 T.E.U.
Kaoshiung
Kobe
1 - 110 T.E.U.
FEEDER PORT
Fe1ixstowe
Dublin
Greenock
Aarhus
Goteburg
Hamburg
Leghorn
Genoa
Barcelona
Valencia
Damman
Kuwai t
Muscat
Cochin
Bombay
Karachi
Madras
Calcutta
Cha1na
Co1umbo+
Chittagong
Bangkok*
Penang*
Jakarta*
Manila
Busan
DISTANCE
115
686
856
454
553
307
236
204
189
347
180
336
347
1600
1193
689
1533
1649.
1578
1581
1517
842
367
490
308
+ Colombo may be used for a line haul port
* Space Charter Agreements
Sources: Distances Between Ports, 1965
Author1s Calculations
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The backbone of the route lies in the eastbound
trans-Pacific leg. This is the trade route containing the
most traffic. Vessel operators have been experiencing load
factors between 80 and 85 percent on this vital leg.
The weakest link in the system is the Europe to Far
East trade. This trade is overtonnaged with load factors
running from 60 percent to 80 percent (Seatrade, 1985b) ."
The service is also running in the wrong direction across
the North Atlantic, as load factors are higher in the west-
bound direction. ~iven the current strength of the dollar,
the load factors eastbound on the North Atlantic are low.
A decline in the strength of the dollar could spark u.s. ex-
ports in the future, thereby improving this situation.
In Northern Europe, the line haul port (stop made by
the trunkline vessels) will be Rotterdam. There will be
several se rvt ces feeding cargo into Rotterdam. Two vessels
will feed cargo from Greenock, Scotland and Dublin, Ireland
into Felixstowe, England. From Felixstowe the cargo will be
transshipped to Rotterdam and loaded aboard the large ships.
Two other feeder services will supply cargo from Sweden and
Denmark. As Rotterdam has a natural attraction for German,
French, and Belgian cargo, U.S. Lines will have good market
coverage in Northern Europe.
The Mediterranean port will be in Marseilles, FOS; a
container terminal built thirty miles from Marseilles. Cargo
from Spain and Italy will be fed into FOS, as well as shipped
in by rail from interior regions. u.S. Lines has been prac-
ticing "price absorption" in Europe, a practice where an ocean
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carrier will subsidize the inland movement of cargo to a
port in order to garner cargo.
The service will make two port ' calls in the Middle
East. The first will be at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. This is
a major container port in the area with the seventeenth
largest throughput of containers in 1982 (Containerization
International Yearbook, 1984). The second mid-eastern call
will be at the new container port of Khor Fakkan, which lies
outside of the Straits of Hormuz in the United Arab Emirates
CUAE). Cargo wi 11 be fed into Khor Fakkan from Kuwait, Paki-
stan, and Western India.
To date, no decision has been announced as to whether
or not Colombo, Sri Lanka will be a line haul port. If not,
the southern and southeastern Asian cargo will be fed into
Singapore. It would make sense to stop in Colombo, Sri Lanka
as it would drastically decrease feeder distances and related
costs. Singapore will be serviced and cargo fed from Malaysia,
Thailand and Indonesia.
The following port will be Hong Kong, then on to
Kaoshsiung which will receive cargo from the Philippines. Kobe,
Japan will be serviced with cargo from Busan, Korea. The
final port in the Far East will be Yokohama.
The vessels will proceed across the North Pacific to
Balboa, and there is a great deal of speculation as to how
much cargo will be transshipped at Panama from the former Delta
and Moore McCormack operations. The United States line haul
ports will be Savannah and New York with barge feeder services
servicing other East Coast ports.
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The total trip will take eighty four days, with
service provided on a weekly basis. The ships will service
seven of the top ten container ports in the world (Container-
ization International Yearbook, 1984). As proposed here,
the total of thirty four countries will be served, including
the South American nations. The route appears to give exten-
sive worldwide coverage, which will enable the feeder services
to capture more north/south cargo which is expected to increase
in importance in the future, as well as link the three main
cargo-producing regions in the northern hemisphere.
Advantages and Disadvantages of the RWS
If developed and operated properly, the RWS can qive a
shipowner flexibility which the operator of the point to point
service does not enjoy. This flexibility can manifest itself
in numerous ways, but, there are also some serious disadvantages
of the system which could overcome this increased flexibility.
The idea of running vessels on triangular and multi"leg routes
has been used successfully in the past, most notably in the
bulk trades. The application of this type of routing to the
highly capital intense container business brinqs its own unique
advantages and disadvantaqes.
The main advantage of the RWS is the fact that slots can
be utilized more economically. The ships will load at one port
for a multitude of ports, and the myriad of short haul possi-
bilities can lead to greater slot utilization. The U.S. ' Lines
system may be able to earn freight three or four times from one
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slot on one global voyage. As each ship will service
several trading areas, it will also be possible to obtain
an optimum cargo stowage to effectively utilize the ship's
time.
The route selected by u.s. Lines also offers certain
advantages. The route connects the three main trading
areas of the world, and is running in the right direction
on the Pacific, which is the world's strongest route. There
are numerous opportunities to feed in North/South cargoes
which are expected to grow as the developing nations industri-
alize. There is. room for expansion built into the system, and
feeder services will be able to link certain geographic regions
(Indian subcontinent, East Africa, etc.) with a truly economic
linehaul service normally not available to them.
As a basically synergistic system, the RWS offers unique
flexibility in its actual operation. Because it services
multiple routes, the shipowner is able to cross-subsidize
capital and marketing efforts from the stronger routes to the
weaker routes. This will be · especially important to u.S.
Lines, which is operating under a high debt burden, and must
work from a zero cargo base i certain routes.
Despite the aforementioned advantages, there are numerous
disadvantages in the system leading many to believe that the RWS
is not the formula for success. The users of the service will
have to be introduced to its advantages and alter their shipping
schedules accordingly. Although the RWS offers certain unique
advantages to shippers, such as the ability to send unsold
44
merchandise around the world in search of a market, unless
the benefits of the RWS are passed onto the shippers they
may be led to believe the system is advantaqeous to ship
operator's cost structures, while providing marginal
benefits to the users of the system.
The system is complex, and requires constant fine
tuning. A high degree of proficiency in cargo stowage will
be needed to avoid problems of overstowage of containers, as
well as overcarried and short-landed cargoes. The logistical
problems of container positioning can be reduced by off-
loading and onloading an equivalent number of containers in
each. port. In the context of positioning the containers, the
Evergreen counter-rotating system provides superior flexi-
bility over the U.S. Lines system, and requires less containers
per ship in the pipeline.
Pertaining to costs, the U.S. Lines' RWS will suffer
from high costs"for worldwide administration, canal tolls,
equipment and feeder services, in addition to the costs asso-
ciated with double-handling of cargo. The RWS must also ser-
vice non-economic routes. To fill these giant vessels will be
quite a chore. The bottom line is that U.S. Lines will have to
offer significant rate reductions or finance a tremendous mar-
keting effort. The savings in per-slot ship costs afforded by
the Econships may well be consumed by increased costs associated
with running the entire system.
Round-the-World services have been shown to be only margin-
ally superior to point-to-point services by computer model (Pear-
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son and Garratt, 1982}. The various approaches which have been
utilized in the past by American President Lines and Barber
Blue "Sea, as well as current services by U.S. Lines, Evergreen,
and Neptune Orient Lines, show significant differences in their
philosophies. By adding to this equation the economies of scale
of Econships, the debate is further complicated. variations
such as a horseshoe-shaped global itinerary have also been
suggested as an alternative to RWS (Pearson and Fossey, 1984)
Time will tell if RWS is indeed the direction toward which liner
shipping will move.
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CHAPTER THREE
STORMCLOUDS ON THE HORIZON
Potential Protectionist Problems
As previously described, the RWS will provide
service (direct or indirect) to thirty four nations
practicing all forms of protectionist impediments.
An attempt to analyze the impediments of all thirty
four nations would be a major work in itself: there-
fore, the focus here will be on a regional basis.
The major crosstrades which u.s. Lines will be
able to participate in include:
1. Europe/Middle East.
2. Europe/Far East and Southeast Asia/Europe.
3. Middle East/Far East and Southeast Asia.
4. Far East and Southeast Asia/Latin America.
5. Latin America/Europe.
There are numerous short haul trades in which the line
could provide service. A. u.S. Lines spokesman has sta ted
that up to 50 percent of the Company's revenues could be
generated in the crosstrades in the future (American Shipper,
19831 .
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The degree to which a nation will impose an impediment
is perhaps a direct manifestation of a nation's desire to
establish, expand, or in some instances, halt the decline of
its merchant fleet. Table 3 shows the merchant fleets of
thirty four nations serviced by the RWS in 1972 and 1982. Al-
though certain factors, such as the development of open
registries, and increased efficiency of the newer container
vessels are not taken into full account in this example, the
table can be used to detect trends in these nations' merchant
fleets.
Another assumption is that nations having government
controlled fleets tend to have increased desires to protect
those fleets, compared to nations having strictly commercially
owned merchant fleets. Table 4 shows 18 of 34 nations operate
government controlled fleets. It should be noted that all but
two of these nations, France and Taiwan, will be indirectly
served with foreign flag feeder services.
u.s. Lines could appease some of these governments by
utilizing their flag vessels as feeders. Problems could still
arise if one ship serviced several nations. If u.S. Lines
line-haul service is in direct competition with services offered
by a national line, hiring that nation's vessels as feeders may
not reduce the impacts of impediments.
The different types of impediments employed by these
thirty four nations are presented in Table 5. Eight of the
thirty four nations practice all four types, while five do not
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TABLE 3
NATIONS SERVED BY ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
Number of General Cargo Vessels
1972-1982
1972 1982
United Kingdom 819 375
Ireland 7
Netherlands 316 351
Denmark 202 315
Sweden 175 126
France 219 161
Spain 230 317
Italy 223 229
Saudi Arabia 6 82
UAE 4
Kuwait 27 21 (1983)
oman 9
Pakistan 54
India 183 231
Bangladesh 2
Sri Lanka
Singapore 135 400
Malaysia (All Vessels) 19 86 (1983)
Indonesia 87 214
Thailand (All Vessels) 21 83 (1983)
Taiwan 101 111
Philippines 102 176
Korea 74 250
Japan 1148 707
Panama 528 1849
Columbia (All Vessels) 35 37
Ecuador (All Vessels) 8 42
Peru (All Vessels) 34 64
Chile (All Vessels) 4.7 35
Venezuela (All Vessels) 43 60
Brazil 148 192
Argentina 61 105
Uruguay (All Vessels) 18 19
Hong Kong
Sources: Maritime Administration, A Statistical Analysis
of the World's Merchant Fleets, 1972 and 1982
Seatrade Publications: Arab Shipping 1984,
Far East Shipping 1984, Latin American Shipping, 1983
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TABLE 4
NATIONS OWNING NATIONAL FLEETS SERVED BY
ROUND THE WORLD SERVICES
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Columbia
France
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Italy
Kuwait
Malaysia
Pakistan
Peru
Spain
Taiwan
Thailand
Uruguay
Venezuela
Source: Records of the Federal Maritime Commission, 1980
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TABLE 5
Treaties &
AgreementsCodist
NATIONS SERVED BY ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
Political Impediments to Cross trading
Government Commercial
Protection PracticesNation
United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
France
Spain
Italy
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Kuwait
oman
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Taiwan
Philippines
Korea
Japan
Panama
Columbia
Ecuador
Peru
Chile
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Hong Kong
y*
y*
y
y*
N
y*
y*
y*
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
y*
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
y
y
y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
y
y
y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
y
y
y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
* Has stated Intention of Ratifying the code.;
Source: Mana1ytics, Inc. U.S. Flag Cross-trading, 1984
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impose any impediments to crosstrading. An analysis of this
type is weakened by not showing the intensity of the applica-
tion of an impediment.
An example of this weakness is evident in the case of
Brazil, which practices only two forms of protectionism. How-
ever, Brazilian trades are among the most restricted in the
world, due to a plethora of bilateral agreements, and severe
government protection. In spite of this weakness, Table 5
can be used to detect potential problem areas when used in con-
junction with a priori knowledge '.
The first region to be considered is Europe. Of the
eight nations . considered, three show a decline in number of
vessels between 1972 and 1982. The others recorded modest
growth. Four of the nations owned government fleets. All of
the nations practiced all forms of protectionism; except for
Sweden which practices none. It would seem that Europe has
incentive to increase their impediments to halt the decline of
certain fleets, and encourage the growth of national fleets.
U.S. Lines is especially interested in the crosstrades
between Europe and the Middle East, Southern Asia, and the Far
East regions. The main impediments to U.S. Lines' success in
these trades are the existing strong, closed conferences.
In 1984, the Far Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC),
carried 73 percent of the Europe/Far East trade. U.S. Lines
has been running as an independent; however, a time may come
when U.S. Lines may choose to enter appropriate conferences,
to assure stability of cargo and rates as supplied by these
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conferences. This may be disallowed due to the closed nature
of the conferences. This subject has been the central issue
in the C.S.G. negotiations (Seatrade, 1984) .
In addition to closed conferences, a corollary issue in
the C.S.G. talks has been ways in which various nations in the
EEC implement the UNCTAD Liner Code. Although all nations in
the EEC have become signatory to the Code with the Brussels
Package reservations, each nation has retained ability to
ratify the Code as they feel fit. Of these survey nations,
only the Netherlands has ratified the Code at present. One
United States fear concerning the Code is that unused shares
of cargo flowing between the EEC and developing nations would
be allocated to the fleets of other EEC members. If the Code
is applied in a very broad sense in European crosstrades, the
independent operators, such as U.S. Lines, and Taiwanese lines
Yang Ming and Evergreen, could suffer considerably.
In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia experienced a rapid in-
crease in merchant ships between 1972 and 1982. The other
na~ions have nominal fleets of general-cargo vessels. A trend
in this region is cooperation between nations. The United Arab
Shipping Company (UASC) is the national flag line of six
countries: Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Quatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the U.A.E. In 1983, the UASC increased its container capacity
by 50 percent. UASC has filed an application fo r entrance into
the FEFC, which would put it in competition with U.S. Lines in
the Europe/Far East trades. The National Shipping Company of
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Saudi Arabia (NSCSA) has increased its containership fleet
considerably, and will vie for cargo flowing to the Far East
with u.S. Lines (Rose, 1984).
The 'Arab countries are attempting to achieve the goals
of the development strategy for the third United Nations
Development Decade, which is trying to create a situation
where 20 percent of the world's fleet is owned by developing
nations (Salman Ad-Hashim , 1983). At the present time, none
of the study nations in the Middle East practice impediments.
Because of their low labor costs and petroleum self sufficiency,
these fleets may be able to increase their market share without
resorting to protectionist measures.
The Southern Asian region is typified by a great deal of
protectionism. Of the study nations, only India showed an in-
crease in the size of her merchant fleet according to the data
available. Pakistan and India have nationally controlled fleets.
All of the nations in this region practice some form of pro-
tectionism. At present, with no port calls by the line-haul
vessels made public by u.S. Lines, this region will be served
by feeder services to the U.A.E. and Singapore. Sri Lanka has
taken the unprecedented step of chartering vessels from Maersk
Line of Denmark to act as its national flag carrier. There are
no indications of a serious increase in protectionist actions
in South Asia in the near future (Manalytics, 1984).
In the Southeast Asian region, all five of the nations
belonging to the Association of South East Asian Nations Bloc
(ASEAN) showed sizeable gains in general-cargo fleets from
1972 to 1982. These five nations consist of Thailand,
54
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Phillipines, four of which
own national fleets. These nations are split on the Code,
as Thailand and Singapore have not become signatory, and
the remaining three have all ratified. The ASEAN nations
are polarized as to protectionism. Singapore and Malaysia
are in the "open seas" camp, the Philippines and Indonesia
support cargo reservation, and Thailand has no clear-cut
policy. ASEAN recently agreed to the need to reserve as
much trade as possible for ASEAN flags, using modified UNCTAD
type legislation. In spite of this agreement, it seems the
ASEAN camp will remain divided with increasing problems in
Indonesia and the Philippines and no changes in the other
nations (Journal of Commerce, 1985).
The nations serviced in the Far East region consist of
Hong Kong (territory of U.K.), Taiwan, Korea and Japan. Be-
tween 1972 and 1982, Japanese and Korean fleets were ~reatly
expanded, while that of Taiwan grew modestly , and the fleet
of Hong Kong remained the same. In this region , only Taiwan
has a national fleet. Concerning protectionism, Korea is the
problem child which practices all forms of protectionism. The
Korean Government has increased its involvement in maritime
affairs. Its financial community has a large stake in the RWS,
therefore, it is doubtful that Korea will take any action which
would hurt U.S . Lines, such as strict enforcement of the
Korea - Taiwan bilateral agreement.
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Japan has announced intentions to ratify the UNCTAD
Code, and the way the Japanese implement the Code may have
bearing upon the success of U.S. Lines in Japanese trades.
Hong Kong has no cargo preference laws. Taiwan has ~rected
protectionism for certain commodites, but, as Taiwan has
built a huge fleet of vessels which will offer round-the-world
services, it seems in Taiwan's best interests to keep cross-
trades open.
Of nine Latin American nations potentially serviced,
six showed substantial gains in number of general-cargo vessels
between 1972 and 1982. Seven of these nine operate government
fleets. Thus , it is obvious that Latin nations are heavily
emphasizing the development of their merchant fleets. With
the acquisition of Moore McCormack and Delta Lines, U.S. Lines
will be a force in the Latin/U.S. trade. However, the abilitv
of U.S. Lines to crosstrade in this region is questionable.
Only three of these nine nations have acceded to the Code:
Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. However, government protectionism
is practiced by all nations, with the exception of Panama. Bi-
lateral agreements, government impelled cargoes, and pooling
arrangements abound in Latin trades. The U.S. Lines' strategy
in Latin America seems to be carriage of cargoes from the Far
East to Panama for transshipment by smaller vessels. Outbound,
the service could accept cargoes for the United States, Europe ,
or the Middle East. Due to the preponderance of agreements be-
tween Latin and European nations, and the strong presence of
carriers from both sides, the ability of U.S. Lines to capture
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outbound crosstrade cargoes is considered questionable.
The biggest trend in Latin shipping is the fact that
it is rapidly being containerized (Fells, 1982). Another
trend which may develop is the rise of "c o ntinentalism" in
shipping (Climent, 1983). The pooling of resources and ex-
pertise will make growing Latin shipping presence even more
powerful, if achieved.
With the exception of the Middle East, U.S. Lines
faces impediments to cargo access in every region in which
it provides RWS. The intensity of application of cargo
preference measures is dependent upon many factors. These
factors include our international relations, as well as the
general state of the world economy.
Measuring the Effectiveness of U.S. Policy
The attempt to measure the effectiveness of any policy
is based on a great many assumptions due to the large number
of intangible factors. An effective policy is one which can
obtain the stated objectives without causing due harm to
other, sometimes unrelated interests. Maritime policy falls
within the field of foreign affairs. Any international policy
must fall within the general philosophy of a nation towards
other nations. Many considerations must be taken into account,
including geopolitical, as well as cultural and economic in-
terests. To further complicate matters, foreign policy must
strive to appease domestic interests as much as possible in
achieving its objective.
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Table 6 shows the level of bilateral liner trades
(by weightl nd, als6 the balance existing in those trades.
European level of trades are generally heavy. Most trades
are fairly balanced, with the exceptions of trades with
France and Italy, which are balanced in favor of Europeans.
The united Kingdom is also an exception which is balanced in
favor of the United States; and, in the case of Saudi Arabia,
grossly so. The trades of ASEAN nations a~e fairly balanced
by weight. In the Far East regions, Japanese trade, by far
the heaviest, shows a balance in favor of the United States.
The imbalanced trades in Latin America are the Venezuelan
trade, which favors the United States and the Brazilian
trade, which favors Brazil.
An assessment by weight does not give a good indication
of the balance of trade value. However, trades which are in-
balanced by weight can have significant impacts on ship oper-
ations, which can be exacerbated by political impediments~
Table 7 shows nine elements which should be taken into
account by United States maritime policy-makers when responding
to cross trace impediments. These factors will be analyzed with
regard to nations involved in the U.S. Lines Round-the-World
service. Some factors will be more heavily considered than
others. Using a great amount of assumptions, an attempt will
be made to measure the effectiveness of certain policy initia-
tives in certain geographic regions.
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NATIONS SERVED BY ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
Level of U.S. Liner Trade 1982
Nation
United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
France
Spain
Italy
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Kuwait
Oman
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Taiwan
Philippines
Korea
Japan
Panama
Columbia
Ecuador
Peru
Chile
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Hong Kong
:rmports From
U. S. (Tons)
1,136,643
67,691
880,531
116,988
227,688
58C,289
367,£64
628,658
1,479,381
229,360
145,736
31,508
169,918
532,993
150,927
78,090
455,505
154,045
543,944
218,147
1,671,510
443,383
1 ,493,816
4 ,277,047
191,244
326,293
211;040
311,510
213,910
1,017,620
351,2'88
267,015
22,454
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Exports To
U • S. ~(Tons)
805,315
62,037
738,646
196,520
241,086
929,986
521,979
1,394,219
5,225
2,389
973
103
40,695
257,356
88,102
41,099
169,448
279,113
488,954
273,152
1,980,320
335 ,992
927,650
3,424,935
64,828
148,202
336,775
193,667
314,425
24,R96
1,210,119
258,914
15,614
TABLE "7
SECTION I:
Factors To Consider When Responding To
Crosstrade Impediments
1. Level of bilateral trade with the United States.
2. Balance of trade between Imports and Exports.
3. Level of Flag Carriage of bilateral trade.
4. Extent of crosstrades in U.s. trades.
5. Treaties in force between the two nations.
6. Economic Aid extended to the Foreign country.
7. Military Aid and Military Importance.
8. Supplier of Strategic Materials
9. The level of cargo at stake. and the economic
impact to U.S. carriers at loss.
* Source: Mana1ytics, Inc.
U.S. Flag Crosstrading, 1984
*(Inc1udes Section II, Table 8)
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The top ten crosstraders in u.s. trades are presented
by nationality as well as flag, in Section II of Table 7.
Of these top ten cross traders shown, seven of the top ten by
nationality, and six of the top ten by flag are serviced by
Round-the-World service, and have a vital interest in keeping
the crosstrades open.
Table 8 shows the percentage of u.s. trade compared
to each nation's total trade, and vice-a-versa, as well as
the ranking of the United States as a trade partner. The
united States was the number one partner in eleven of thirty-
four cases, and in the top jive of trading partners in all
cases. The United States trade was most important to several
Latin and Far Eastern nations. Japan is overwhelmingly the
most valuable trading partner, with the United Kingdom placing
second, and Saudi Arabia in third place.
Table 9 shows the amount of direct economic and military
aid given to survey nations receiving funds from the Agency for.
International Development (AID). Also shown in Table 9 is the
amount of aid those nations receive from international organiza-
tions which the United States contributes to. There are other
private and public organizations which provide direct aid, as
well as numerous loans and other forms of economic assistance.
The AID contribution is a representative case to show where
funds may be flowing. A majority of direct aid flows to the
Southern Asian regions, with ASEAN countries next in line.
The problem of military assistance is complex, as large
amounts of covert aid and arms sales are financed under the
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TABLE 7 (CoH4tiaued)
SECTION II:
Top Ten Crosstraders in U.S. Trades
A. By Nation:
1- West Gennany
2. Denmark
3. Norway
4. United Kingdom
5. Australia
6. Japan
7. Hong Kong
8. Sweden
9. Taiwan
10. Netherlands
B. By Fl ag: *
1- Panama
2. West Gennany
3. Liberia
4. Denmark
5. United Kingdom
6. Singapore
7. Greece
8. Norway
9. Netherlands
10. Sweden
* 13 (b)( 5) wou1d be an effective response
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TABLE 8
NATIONS SERVED BY ROUND THE WORLD SERVICE
Percentage of U.S. Trade to Total Trade
Percentage of· Nations Trade to Total U.S. Trade
Value US $
Nation US Trade/Total Trade Nation Trade/Total US Of. 0
United Kingdom 11 (2)* 5.0
Ireland 13 (2) 0.2
Netherlands 9 (3 ) 1.0
Denmark 7 (4) 0.3
Sweden 14 (3 ) 0.8
France 8 (4) 2.3
Spain 14 (1) 0.6
Italy 7 (3) 2.3
Saudi Arabia 21 ( 1 ) 3.1
UAE 13 ( 2 ) 0.8
Kuwait 14 "(2)
Oman 7 (3 )
Pakistan 10 (2 )
India 12 (1) 0.6
Bangladesh 11 (3)
Sri Lanka 6 (5 )
Singapore 13 (3) 0.9
Malaysia 15 ( 2 ) 0.8
Indonesia 15 (2 ) 1.8
Thailand 13 (3) 0.4
Taiwan
Philippines 23 ( 1) 0.8
Korea 23 (2) 2.4
Japan 18 ( 1) 15.8
Panama 34 ( 1)
Columbia 35 (1 ) 0.3
Ecuador (1981) 39 ( 1) 0.5
Peru 34 (1) 0.4
Chile 22 (1) 0.3
Venezuela 48 (1) 2.0
Brazil 15 (2) 1.8
Argentina 23 ( 1 ) 0.5
Uruguay 10 (3 )
Hong Kong 10 (3) 2.3
Source: 1982 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,
United Nations
* ( ) : U.S. Ranking as a Trade Partner
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TABLE 9
NATIONS SERVED BY ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
1982 Aid R&cipients (In~illions/Q.a. Dol~ars)
15 30 17
200 260 (1983) 555
221 .1 2,287
172 .2 599
71 2.1 170
91 42 1,394
36 80 874
107 51 694
13 16 127
23 5 444
NATION
United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
France
Spain
Italy
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Kuwait
Oman
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Taiwan
Philippines
Korea
Japan
Panama
Columbia
Ecuador
Peru
Chile
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Hong Kong
Direct Aid
Received
22
52
Military
Assistance
127
Total From Int'l
Organizations
40
Source: Agency for International Development
Congressional Presentation. Fiscal Year 1986, 1984
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Foreign Military Sales. Program (FMS). The primary recipient
of direct assistance was Pakistan, followed by several ASEAN
countries next in line for arms. In geopolitical terms, the
Round-the-World service stops in most of the more strategic-
ally important areas ot the world. Of vital importance to
military strategy in the United States are Euro~e (NATO), the
Middle East (oil), Japan and the Philippines (allies and sites
of major overseas deployments), as well as the Panama Canal;
and this ~ould have profound effects on maritime" policy.
Another strategic consideration is the supply ot materials
considered vital to the United States economy and military. Ot
prime importance is oil, and the Middle East and Venezuela are
key suppliers. Of non-oil materials, Brazil supplies manganese
(19 percent of imports from 1977-1980), and the Philippines
supplies chromite (15 percent ot imports from 1977-1980).
The nature of treaties in force between two nations can
also exert an intluence on maritime policies. Besides treaties
for security reasons, there are treaties named Treaties ot
Friendship, Commerce and Navigations (FCN). The United States
has FCN treaties with twelve ot the thirty tour survey nations
in all regions except Southern and Southeast Asia. Since an
FCN treaty is basically a statement ot goodwill, the application
of equal access to trade provisions may be of questionable rele-
vance to U.S. maritime policy.
The final two factors to be considered in assessing the
potential policy responses are the level ot carriage ot the two
nations at either end ot a crosstrade route, and amount ot cargo
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potentially at risk. These are situation-dependent variables
which are difficult to analyze.
Table 10 shows the effectiveness of several maritime
responses to crosstrade impediments in the survey nations.
The parameters for the effectiveness of responses is also
included at the bottom of the table. Tariff suspension under
Section l3(b) (5) would be effective in eight of thirty four
cases; primarily in European and Far Eastern nations, as well
as open registry nations crosstrading in U.S. trades. Denial
of access to U.S. ports, or the imposition of operating re-
strictions would be effective in twenty three of thirty four
cases, which reflects the importance of U.S. trade to many
nations.
Table 11 shows the effectiveness of non-maritime
responses to crosstrading, including parameters listed at the
bottorr. of the table. Increased duties or the imposition of
embargoes or quotas, which can be protectionist as well as
punitive, would be effective in twenty eight of thirty four
cases. The exceptions are in the EEC where the nations'
mutual trade is as important as U.S. trade.
The alteration of direct economic assistance would be
effective in thirteen of thirty four cases. This would be
effective in the Southern and Southeast Asian regions, and
certain Latin nations as well. The alteration of direct
military aid would be effective in nine cases. Some of the
complexities of military aid and arms sales were alluded to
earlier.
G6
TABLE 10
NATIONS SERVED BY ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
Effectiveness of Maritime Responses
Nation
United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
France
Spain
Italy
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Kuwait
Oman
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Taiwan
Philippines
Korea
Japan
Panama
Columbia
Ecuador
Peru
Chile
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Hong Kong
13(b)(5)
Tariff Suspension
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
~
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Deny Nat'l Vessels Port Access/
Impose Operating Restrictions
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
~
~
13(b)(5): Yas, if top ten crosstraders in U.S . trades by
nation or flag.
Deny Access: Yes, if nation's flag carriage in U.S. trades
is greater than 10 percent (imports/exports)
or a major crosstrader in U.S. trades .
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TABLE 11
~ATIONS SERVED BY ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE
Effectiveness of No~-Maritime Respo~ses
Increased Duties Alter Aid
Nation Emb ar:.g.<?_es -Quo t as Economic Military
United Kingdom .y :'i N
Ireland Y N N
Netherlands :-i N N
Denmark N N N
Sweden Y N ~
France N N N
Spain Y Y Y
Italy N Y N
Saudi Arabia Y
-
Oil N N
UAE Y
-
Oil N N
Kuwait Y
-
Oil N N
Oman N Y Y
Pakistan Y Y Y
India Y Y N
Bangladesh Y Y N
Sri Lanka N Y N
Singapore Y N N
Malaysia Y - Tin N N
Indonesia Y Y Y
Thailand Y
-
Tin Y Y
Taiwan Y N N
Philippines Y
-
Chromite Y Y
Korea Y N N
Japan Y N \f
Panama Y Y Y
Columbia Y N N
Ecuador Y Y Y
Peru Y Y Y
Chile Y N N
Venezuela Y - Oil N ~T
Brazil Y
-
Manganese N ~
Argentina Y N N
Uruguay Y N N
Hong Kong Y N N
Increased Duties: Yes, if trade with U.S. greater than
10% total trade by value.
Alter Aid: Yes. if significant amount given.
Materials have strategic importance which may effect policy.
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In conclusion, the most favored policy responses, on a
regional basis, would be:
Europe: .
Middle East:
Southern Asia:
Far East:
Latin America:
13(b)(5), tariff suspension
or operating restrictions
none, given survey parameters
alteration of economic and
military aid or quotas
13(b)(5), tarift suspension
or operating restrictions
operating restrictions and
embargoes
The use ot embargoes, quotas and alteration of aid have
not proven effective in other areas of foreign affairs. The
emphasis in our maritime policy should be on maritime responses.
The linkage to non-maritime responses should only be made in
cases of severe damage to U.S. carriers. This type ot policy
is effective with major maritime nations. The response to non-
maritime nations should be to continue the current policy of
tailoring responses to each situation. Thus, there are no
specific policies which U.S. Lines can request the Government
to implement that would satisfy their needs in all geographic
areas.
Outlook for the Future
Protectionism is a trend which will surely continue, and
increase in strength in the future. Indeed, the current
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strength of the dollar has increased protectionist pressures
in our own nation. It is evident that U.S. Lines faces im-
pediments in every region, and the level of aid it can expect
from the Government in fighting these impediments varies con-
siderably by region. Future events which may very well bring
protectionism to a boiling point include:
1. A newly revised and more implementable UNCTAD
Liner Code in 1988.
2. The proliferation of bilateral agreements.
3. A serious shake-out in liner shipping, which
many believe will occur in the next several
years (Muller, 1985).
4. A serious loss of cargo carried by conferences
such as the FEFC, causing a backlash upon
independents.
5. An increase in commercial impediments and agree-
ments, such as the Maersk/Sri Lanka pact, which
exclude other carriers from certain trades.
6. The sale of older container tonnage, in lieu of
scrapping, to developing nations.
The United States has already successfully, it only temp-
orarily, imposed its will to keep the seas open in dealings with
the Philippines, Korea, and several Latin nations. The applica-
tion of our policy to crosstrades awaits its first usage; however,
speculation as to its effectiveness abounds. In any case, it is
certain that any United States response to crosstrading impedi-
ments will have only limited international support.
Perhaps a more viable method of combatting protectionism is
to utilize a more commercial tact . Increased cooperation between
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United States carriers and foreign carriers is now underway.
American shippers are participating in C.S.G. and other nego-
tiations through the Shippers for Competitive Ocean Transport-
ation (SCOT) organization (Jessen and Davis, 1985). The goal
of both carriers and shippers should be to reduce the govern-
ment's role in solving maritime problems.
U.S. Lines will have to develop an effective dialogue with
both foreign governments and carriers in order to exhaust all
remedies before the FMC is forced to step" in and deal with the
~inkages that cause such complexity in" foreign policy.
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CHAPTER FOUR
BREAKDOWN OF OPERATING COSTS
Introduction
In order to properly assess the impact of political
impediments upon an RWS, it is necessary to understand the
economic viability of the system. Due to the lack of pro-
prietary information, as well as the complexity of certain
factors, (freight rates, port pricing, administration), this
breakdown of costs is merely a thUMbnail sketch. As the RWS
is a "through" system which incorporates feeder service and
land transport aspects, a ship's costs are only a fraction of
system costs. A recent estimate places this ration between
25 percent and 35 percent (Seatrade, 1985b) .
Three sources were used primarily in the analysis of
vessel operating costs. The differences in the methods of
describing ship costs has been elaborated upon in Chapter
One. The breakdown used in this study was presented in ~anage-
ment and Operatinq of. American Shioping, by E. Frankel. A
second source was a 1979 Maritime Administration study on
daily operating expenses, using a C-8 containership's expenses.
The final source is a study of the U.S. Lines RWS by the account-
ing firm of Laurence Prust and Co., the results were published
in Fairplay Shipping Weekly (Fairplay, 1985). The Prust
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data was used as a reterence point, and soma data was used
to fill in gaps in the analysis.
Fixed Costs
The tirst class ot costs to be studied are tixed costs.
These include costs tor capital, crew, insurance, and general
administrat ion . Fixed costs are those which remain st-eady, in
spi t6" of changes in scheduling or >routing o r: the vessel.
The largest single element involved in the daily operating
costs ot a containership is the debt incurred in building the
vessel and the necessary amount ot containers. In the case ot
the Econships, the hulls cost $47.5 million each. It is esti-
mated that each vessel will require two full sets ot containers
(estimated at $6,000 per 40 toot container). Factors such as
depreciation and taxation will not be considered to simplity
the analysis.
There are various methods in estimating the actual costs
involved in purchasing a ship. These include the net present
value method, the payback method, and the internal rate ot re-
turn, ' among others. Many ot these methods utilize "net cash
flows" which represent the change in the company's cash receipts
and expenditures as a result of the project in question.
It some estimate ot tuture cash tlows could be made, the
aforementioned methods would be usetul in measuring viability
of the RWS system. However , since we are merely attempting to
breakdown the financial costs associated with a single vessel,
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a good starting point is to utilize the present value of an
annuity method. This method measures the value at present of
annual payments made over a given time period at a certain rate
of interest (Slogget, 1984). The formula for this method is:
PV = Annuity (x) X PVIF
where PV = Present Value of Investment
x = Yearly Payment
PVIF = Present Value Interest Factor
TO calculate PVIF, tables are used which are derived from the
following formula:
61 1 t)PVIF = 1 + r)
r
where r = Interest Rate
t = Time over which financinq is arranaed
In the case of the hull, the shipyard f.inanced 80 ~ercent
of the $47.5 million cost at 9 percent over ten years. The line
financed the 20 percent down payment by takinq various loans
with a floating rate (approximately 12 percent) over a twel~e
year period.
The present value of both down and deferred pay~ents were
calculated, along with the present value of the annuity for both,
in order to determine a total annual payment. The resultinq
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annuity totalled $6,519,265 per ship/year, which translates
to a hull financing cost of $17,861 per day.
In calculating the number of containers purchased per
vessel, several factors must e considered. The first is that
two and one half to three sets of containers are required per
vessel. Other factors to be considered include the fact that
u.s. Lines is stressing forty foot containers, and already owns
a considerably large amount of containers and chassis (1982 -
u.s. Lines owned thirty thousand containers and fifteen thousand
chassis). In view of this information, two sets of forty foot
containers per vessel seem sufficient. At an estimated cost of
$6,000 per container, the present value of the annuity for forty-
four hundred containers was calculated at $4,667,976, translating
to a daily finance cost for containers of $12,788.
Frankel (1981) stated an average yearly cost of an American
seaman in 1981 to be $51,020, including wages and benefits. This
cost was appreciated at 6 percent per year, providinq an
estimated annual cost of $72,885 per seaman in 1985. The annual
costs of two complete crews of twenty one seamen totaled
$3,061,200, translating to a daily cost of $8,500, as stated in
the Prust study (Fairplay, 1985).
Frankel, Prust and MARAD all state insurance costs to be
$1,800 per day, which was used in this analysis. Both hull and
Protection and Indemnity insurance are included in this amount.
The cost of administration is a thorny issue. The amount
to be attributed to ship costs versus svstem costs is difficult
to determine. However, one certain fact is that RWS will require
a worldwide ,administrative network. With the exception of
the Europe/Far East route, U.S. Lines has an existing admin-
istration; due to former service in those areas or through the
acquisition of Delta Lines and Moore-McCormack Lines.
Frankel (l98l) estimated administration costs account
for 22 to 35 percent of operating costs~ RWS would certainly
be in the top of that category. These costs will be borne by
twelve vessels on an identical route. In this analysis, admin-
istrative costs were considered to be 36 percent of total
operating costs. This figure was then divided by twelve to
estimate per ship costs, which amounted to $1,700 per day. This
daily costs figure is considerably higher than the $1,000 per
day figure as provided in the Prust study.
As a result, fixed costs accounted for a total of $42,650
per day in operating costs, or 66 percent of total operating
costs. As such a high pe =centage of operatinq costs are not
within a shipow~er's ability to chanqe, this can explain why
shipowners act as they do in many cases (i.e., inflexibility
to change, etc.).
Variable Costs
Variable costs are those within a shipowner's ability to
alter given changes in routing, scheduling, or operating proce-
dures. In a routinq strategy such as the RWS, some costs may
indeed be fixed in nature, but the service has yet to be deve-
loped so they are considered as variable. A further distinction
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will be made between those incurred at sea versus those
incurred in port.
Of variable costs, fuel and lUbe costs make the largest
contribution to operating expenses. The Econships ar rated
to burn approximately seventy three tons of bunker C fuel per
day. An average of $190 per ton for 180 C.S.T. bunker fuel,
or a daily average of $13,870 was derived from the Journal of
Commerce for a week's period of April 8 through April il, 1985.
Lube oil costs, obtained from MARAD data and Frankel as
no figures could be found, resulted in the daily cost of
approximately $1,000. Econships carry enough fuel to make a
full trip, allowing bunkering where prices are cheapest . At
the time of this writing, Singapore was the port with the cheap-
est bunker~ on the proposed route, with a price of $180 per
ton.
It can be assumed that in port one of three lOOO-kilowatt
generators on the Econships will be running at· all times. From
industry sources, it has been determined that a qenerator of
this capacity will burn between sixty-two and sixty-three qal-
lo~s per hour. At a cost of one dollar per gallon for diesel
fuel, daily fuel costs for periods in port will be approximately
fifteen hundred dollars . .
The next major variable cost is that of supplies and
miscellaneous expenses; the general category allocated for any
unexpected expense. U.S. Lines will have the advantage in the
acquisition of deck and engine stores, as it is able to bUy in
large quantities where these items are cheapest worldwide. In
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conjunction with computerized inventories, supply costs can be
kept down. Frankel (~98l) uses an estimate for supply and
miscellaneous expenses of 3.8 percent of operatinq expenses.
This figure was utilized, and a figure of $2,300 per day was
the result. Although this figure is considerably higher than
that provided by Prust, until potential problems with the
vessels or their designs are resolved, a higher figure for
miscellaneous expenses is justified.
Maintenance and repairs are another variable cost. In-
cluded in this category are annual surveys, as well as regular
hull and engine maintenance. Maintenance costs increase as a
vessel ages, constituting an increasing percentage of operating
costs. The size of a vessel is also a factor to be considered.
Econships will require special dry-docking facilities, as well as
specialized equipment to effect engine and hull maintenance.
A non-economic factor is the policy of the U.s. r,overnment
on taxation of items acquired abroad, in addition to the use of
foreign shipyards. Although the Econships are not subsidized,
other U.s. Lines vessels are; therefore, the company must abide
by certain subsidy obligations. Recent legislation may ease the
burden in this regard. Both the Prust study and Frankel concur
on the figure of $1,800 per day, thus, this figure was used in
this analysis.
The final costs to be considered are those for port and
canal charges. rhe figure of $1,500 per day, provided by Prust,
was utilized, given the complexity and dynamic nature of port
pricing. Many ports develop their own formulas for charging
for use of their facilities, causing prices to be in a state
7R
of constant flux. This can be attributed to intense inter-
port competition, as ports vie for load center status.
Table 12 provides the tolls for the Suez and Panama
Canals. One feature of the RWS is it encurs a great amount of
canal related costs. Per information from an industry source,
$1,600 per day could be accounted for~ however, the data was
incomplete in costs associated with the Panama Canal, and the
Prust figure of $3,000 per day is more realistic. Despite its
shortcomings, Table 12 indicates the high expenses an Econship
incurs in transmitting the canals.
Table 13 is a summary of the breakdown of operating
costs. It can be seen that the costs involved in operating an
Econship total $23 million per annum, or $63,000 per day. This
is several thousand dollars higher than the Prust study given
more emphasis on miscellaneous and administrative costs.
For the large amount of container capacity they afford,
the Econships compare favorably with any other containerships
on a per day basis. Seatrade, (1985, c), states a figure of
$38,000 per day for an Evergreen G-class vessel, and $42,000
for a five year old, 1500 TEU European vessel. On the basis
of hardware, u.S. Lines is more than competitive.
System Costs and Potential Earnings
The major goal of most containership operators today is
to reduce the cost per container-mile to the lowest possible
level, sometimes called a unit or slot cost. Given the
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TABLE .1 2
U.S. LINES "ECONSHIPS"
TRANSIT TOLLS FOR PANAMA AND SUEZ CANALS
PANAMA CANAL
Tolls
Per Net Ton
18,700 Net Tons
Pilotage
Weekends
Holidays
Total Panama Tolls
51. 83
$34,221
$ 70 Per Hour
$400 Per Hour
$136,884 Per Annum
SUEZ CANAL
Suez ' Tonnage (Aprox): Mean between gross and net tonnage
Suez Deadweight Ratio (S.D.R.) = 1 .08S9 (US $)
Tolls (Laden Vessel Southbound)
First 5 ,000 Tons ~ 4 .55 S.D.R.
Next 15 ,000 Tons @ 2.5 S.D .R .
Balance @ 2.15 S.D.R.
-Containers stacked more than
two high per deck - add 7.5%
Tugs and Pilotage
=
=
=
=
22 ,750
37,500
38,700
7,421
15,000
S.D.R.
S.D.R.
S.D.R.
S.D.B..
S.D.R.
Total S.D.H. per transit
Total $ per transit
Total $ per annum
Total $ Panama and Suez Canals
Tot:ll Cana.l Costs per day
= 121,371 S.D.R .
= $111,462
= $445,849
= $582,733
s 1.600
Sources: Industry Source/Personal Calculation
TABLE 13
u.s. LINES "ECONSHIPS"
OPERATING COSTS
A. General Information
Eastbound Voyage
Nautical Miles
Time At Sea/Voyage
Time In Canals/Voyage
Port Time/Voyage
Voyage/Annum
Distance/Annum
TEU Miles/Annum
At Sea/Annum
Canal Time/Year
Port Time/Year
B. Fixed Costs Per Day
Hull Financing
Container Financing
Crew Costs
Insurance Costs
Administration Costs
Total:
C. Variable Costs Per Day At Sea
Fuel Costs
Lube Oil Costs
Maintenance and Repair
Supplies and Miscellaneous
Total:
83 days
26,744 Total Distance
·62 Days
3 Days
19 Days
4.3
157,999.2
690 Million
267
12
86
$17,861
12,789
8,500
1,800
1,700
$42,650
$13,870
1,000
1,800
2,300
$18,970
D. Variable Costs Per Day in Port/Canal
Fuel and Lube Costs in Port
Port Charges
Maintenance and Repair
Supplies and Miscellaneous
Total:
Canal Charges Per Day:
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$ 1,500
6,200
1,800
2,300
$11,800
3,000 (365 days)
TABLE 13
u.s. LINES "ECONSHIPS"
OPERATING COSTS - ANNUAL TOTALS
E. Fixed Costs
Hull Financing
Container Financing
Crew Costs
Insurance Costs
Administration Costs
Total Per Annum
F. Variable Costs
AT SEA:
Fuel and Lube
Maintenance and Repair
Supplies/Miscellaneous
Total Per Annum/At Sea
IN PORT:
Fuel and Lube
Port Charges
Maintenance and Repair
Supplies/Miscellaneous
Canal Charges
$ 6,519,265
4,667,985
3,102,500
657,000
628,628
$15,575,378
$ 4,040,804
488,700
670,075
$ 5,199,579
$ 141,900
547,500
170,280
217,580
1,095,000
Total Per Annum/In Port $ 2,172,260
TOTAL PER ANNUM $22,947,217
TOTAL PER DAY s 62,869
G. Cost as Percentage of Total Costs
Fixed Costs:
Variable/At Sea:
Variable/In Port:
Canal Charges:
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66 Per Cent
24 Per Cent
4 Per Cent
6 Per Cent
proposed itinerary and cost structure, the unit costs for an
Econship are shown in Table 14, for various load factors.
The unit costs calculated are approximately one half of those
associated with a five year old European ship (Seatrade, 1985
cl. A major reason for the current excess of containerships
on the world market is the fact that decreased manninq, in-
creased fuel efficiency, and economies of scale can reduce costs.
However, it must be remembered that the seaborne leg of a
door-to-door container shipping service may not constitute a
major part of the total shipping costs. As for u.s. Lines,
even a great reduction in unit costs offered by Econships may
not warrant the kind of investment which has been made, given
current market conditions. The numbers for daily operating
costs and unit costs for the Econships are impressive, but one
must consider the system as a whole to get an idea of the vi-
ability of the RWS. The fact that u.s. Lines is concentrating
their efforts on forty foot containers indicates a desire to ex-
tend economies of scale to the feeder and i~land legs of the RWS.
If the ship costs represented only a third of system costs,
the RWS would require fairly high load factors, utilizing the
operating cost structure given in this analysis. This assumption
is based on a simplified freight rate structure. The goal of
Malcolm McLean must be to achieve economies of scale on land,
which would increase the ratio of ship costs to system costs
nearer to forty or fifty percent. Table 15 illustrates the
freight rates which could be offered on certain routes if the
ship cost/system cost ratio reached 50 percent. In this type
of analysis, the ability of u.s. Lines to undercut is high.
83
TABLE 11
U.S. LINES "ECONSHIPS"
OPERATING COSTS
UNIT COST PER CONTAINER MILE
Utilization 100% 3.5 Cents/Container/Mile
75% 4.6 Cents/Container/Mile
50% 6.9 Cents/Container/Mile
25% 13.8 Cents/Container/Mile
COST OF DIVERSION OF VESSEL
Per Mile of Diversion
POTENTIAL REVENUES PER VOYAGE
$146.00
Util ization 100% $ 21,000,000
75% 15,750,000
50% 10,500,000
25% 5,250,000
POTENTIAL REVENUES BASED ON:
Full Load
Full Load
Full Load
Europe/Middle East/Far East 51500/TEU
Far East/North America 52000/TEU
North Atlantic 51500/TEU
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TABLE '15
REQUIRED FREIGHT RATES AT 75% UTILIZATION
ROUTE TO MEET TO MEET ESTIMATED
SHIP'S COSTS SYSTEW S COSTS· CURRENT RATE
N. America/N. Europe 160 320 1.000
N. America/Mediterranean 260 520 1,200
N. America/Mideast 362 724 1.500
N. Europe/Mi deast 222 444 1.000
N. Europe/Far East 435 870 1.500
Far East/N. America 509 1,018 2.000
Far East/Europe 670 1,340 2,000
·Ship Costs = ~ System Costs
POTENTIAL ANNUAL EARNINGS
(Revenues - Costs, 11 Ships)
Util i zation Percentage U.S. Doll ars (~llions)
100% = 486
75% = 245
70% = 195
65% = 145
60% = 100
55~~ = 46
50% = -4
45% = -54
40% = -1l0
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The potential annual earnings for the RWS are also
given in Table 15. The breakeven point occurs at a load
factor of 50 percent. Even in heavily overtonnaqed routes,
such as the Eas·tbound North Atlantic, operators are achleving
this type of load factor. However, it must be remembered
that half of a load on an Econship is a full load for most
cf the competition. Unless high load factors are achieved,
the economies of scale offered by Econships are virtually
eliminated. If U.S. Lines achieves load factors qreater
than 75 percent, the high return on investments, as well as
their ability to ndercut freight rates, would appear to
make the system unbeatable.
A final consideration is the ability of U.S. Lines to
cL0ss-subsidize from other operations not connected to RWS.
If South American trades pick up steam, the company is in a
good position to generate high revenues. Likewise, the
established operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific trades
were making profits in 1984, and some· of these revenues are
destined to be invested in the RWS. ~t present, the RWS
appears to be marginal in economic terms. The system has
the potential to be a major force; and, if high enough load
factors can be reached, the competition may have to match
the investment to continue to compete. Events in the years 1986
and 1987 will prove which scenario is accurate.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
The great number of intangible factors involved in
analyzing the possible effects of protectionism in shipping
renders the ability to make projections virtually impossible.
Equally frustrating is the attempt to predict the success or
failure of a policy which has yet to be used. The bottom
line is that protectionism will increase, despite any policy
the United States pursues.
The RWS meets this protectionism threat head-on. The
system must have access to crosstrade cargoes, even if they
are merely hauled a short distance. Slot utilization, not
unit costs, will be the dominant factor which determines the
success or failure of the RWS. The marginal nature of the
system has already been established; thus, any loss of carqo
from non-commercial means spells trouble for u.s. Lines.
A recent forecast states the G.N.P. of the United States
will increase by only 4 percent in 1985, as compared to an
increase of 6.8 percent in 1984 (Magnier, 1985). In contrast
to the world fleet, the outlook is bleak for all operators.
The question of who survives may be dependent upon financial
support, rather than superior management or equipment.
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In view of this, it appears that U.S. Lines has overextended
themselves in their substantial investment in the RWS, and
ac~uisition of Delta Lines . Although the level of government
backing which Evergreen Lines received is not known, it can be
safely said that, unless the bottom falls out of the market,
Evergreen will remain in business . The same is true for the
other ~;ovei.·nment con t r o l Led lines, as well as the cornrnu nLs t
bloc fleets capturing cargo on certain routes. The conference
lines are cooperating more , due to the threllt of independent
lines. Another occuring trend is rationalization agreements
between de ve l o p Lng nations, and commercial lines in developed
nations.
U.S. Lines is competing with lines not necessaril~ having
to show a profit, and conferences which may soon be fighting
for their survival. This comes at a time when the company has
a substantial amount of debts. and ma~ havH to endure a few
lean years. The system does not lend itself to rationalization.
except through feeder services.
Although it is growing , protectionism is not an immediate
problem . The U~CTAD Code has legitimized the concerns of the
developing nations; however, it does not seem to be the instru-
ment tel c r e a t e c a r go - s ha r i ng schemes nationwide . At present,
the real threat is the possible rise in bilateralism and commer-
c ial imped imen t s , wh i ch cou Id mean a loss 0 f .') l )l l thern As i an and
Far Eastern cargoes for U.S. Lines. U.S. Linps' options for
non-U.S. trade in Latin America are already Limited.
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The U.S. Government has supported the development of the
RWS, and will continue to support the line in gaining free
access to cargoes. With the European nations and certain Far
Eastern nations, the United States should be able to maintain
reasonably free trades. Access to closed conferences may con-
tinue to present problems; however, it is believed that U.S.
Lines prefers to remain an outsider as long as they are able to
maintain reasonable load factors. The greatest loss of cargo
directly resulting from protectionism is intraregional cargoes
in Latin America and the Far East. In Europe/Far East trades,
and vice a versa, competition will be the prevalent factor, not
protectionism.
Projecting future developments in the shipping industry is
a precarious task. The attempt here has been to outline problems,
and consider potential impacts upon a new shipping service. In
the long run, protectionism may be a key factor in the success or
failure of the RWS. However, the system faces pressing problems,
and the performance of the market is of overriding concern.
The revenues desperately needed by U.S. Lines may be pro-
vided by the eastbound Pacific leg. A load factor of approxiately
75 percent on this leg would ensure ship's cost are met for a
voyage. Thus, the line haul service can provide for itself. The
system costs ~re more vexing, requiring U.S. Lines make strategic
decisions concerning feeder services, inland transport. and deal-
ings with shippers. Two key elements will be successful marketing
in the United States, and cooperation with foreign nationals.
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As of the present time U.S. ~ines has not made a major
advertising push in trade journals and magazines. Behind
the scenes, however, the company is most likely very busy
gearing up for the full scale introduction of the RWS. A
major advantage that U.S. Lines enjoys versus Evergreen is
a home market which is the largest in the world whereas Ever-
green has a fairly small home market which is showing signs
of slowing down. The Evergreen RWS is thus even more depen-
dent upon crosstrades , and more vulnerable to protectionist
impediments.
In the foreign sphere -i t is obvious that U.S. Lines must
develop good relations with foreign governments and shipping
interests. This could be achieved by cooperative training
and information exchange programs. As barter trade grows in
importance, shipping companies may well need some kind of in-
side line to gain cargoes which are subject to barter agree-
ments. The solutions to protectionism seem to be in commer-
cial actions, rather than government intervention. In severe
cases the FMC may well playa major role, but linkages under-
mine government effectiveness despite the strong wording of
13(b)(5) of the 1984 Shipping Act. Another impediment to
government effectiveness is the protectionist pressures being
exerted from with the United States itself. It would be diffi-
cult to forcefully oppose protectionism internationally at a
time when it is growing in strength domestically.
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In summary, protectionism is not a key element in the
success or failure of the RWS, but, rather it is a· threat to
the long term. However, it is believed that proper behaviour
by the company, along with prudent policy enforcement by the
FMC, will allow U.S. Lines to develop the RWS on a commercial
basis. The success or failure of the RWS will depend upon its
performance in the first three or four years. The economies
of the system, as well as the world market, will determine if
Malcolm McLean's dream will come true.
91
References Cited
American Bureau of Shipping (1984), "Giants Designed
for Containers", ABS Surveyor, 18:4, 12-17.
American Shipper (1983), "How Cri tical is Crosstrading
to u.S. Flags?", 25:11, 11-12.
American Shipper (1984), "U.S. Lines' Low Unit Cost
Entry", 26: 9, 25-26.
American Shipper (1985), "Green Strikes Out at Commercial
Cargo Agreements", 27:4, 3.
Bohme, H. (1984), "The Changinq Framework of Shipping",
Marine Policy, 8:2, 229-238.
Branch, A. (1982), Economics of Shipping Practice and
Management, London: Chapman and Hall.
Clirnent, A. (1983), "The Iberoarnerican Merchant Marine
Rides Out the World Shipping Crisis", Latin American
Shipping, London: Seatrade Publications, 25-29.
Containerisation International (1985), "To Tame a Monster",
19:2, 47-50.
Containerisaticn International Yearbook 1984, "Containership
Fleet Set for 2 Million TEU by 1986", 15-17.
CSR Consultants (1984), Containership Demand in the Eighties,
Surrey: CSR.
Fairplay (1985), "Analyst Estimates Costs of USL Super-Econ
Ships", 293: 5297, 32.
Fells, H. (1982), "The Liner Trades: I n i t i a l Impact of
Unitisation Being Absorbed", Latin American Sh i p p i na 1982,
London: Seatrade Publications, 42-45.
Frankel, E. et al (1991), "Impact of Cargo Sharing on u.s.
Liner Trade", Marine Policy, 5:1, 23-39.
Frankel, E. (1982), Management and Operations of American
Shipping, Boston: Auburn House.
Goss, R. (1967), "The Turnaround of Cargo Liners and Its
Effect Upon Sea Transport Costs", Journal of Transportation
Economics and Policy, 1:1, 75-89.
92
Heaver, T. (1985), "The Treatment of Shipls Operating Costs"
Maritime Policy and Management, 12:1, 35-46.
Jessen, J. and Davis, D. (1985), "Shippers Fight to Keep
the Open Seas Open", Distribution, 84:1, 44-47.
Journal of Commerce (1985), "Modified UNCTAD Legislation
Could Be Boon for ASEAN Shipping", March 11, 6c.
Juda, L. (1981), "World Shipping, UNCTAD, and the New
International Economic Order", International Organization,
35: 3, 493- 515 .
Kendall, L. (1983), The Business of Shipping, Centreville:
Cornell.
Magnier, M. (1985), "Stormy Seas Forecast for Container
Shipping", Journal of Commerce, May 21, lA-lB.
Manalytics, Inc. (1984), u.S. Flag Crosstrading, San Francisco:
Prepared for the Office of Market Development, MARAD, 3 Vols.
t'-1all:'iiJ.e Engineering Log (1984), "American New York", 89:8, 59-61.
.tu.l l.e r , E. (1985), "R.i.ding the Swells of the Sea of Overcapacity",
Distribution, 84:3, 11-16.
Odeke, A. (1984), "The Brussels Package: The United Kingdom
and the EEC Respond to the Code", Maritime Policy and
Management, 11:4, 233-250.
Office of Technology Assessment (1983), An Assessment of
Maritime Trade and Technology, Washington:Congress of
the United States.
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1983) ,
Maritime Transport 1983, Paris:OECD.
Pearson, R. and Garratt, N. (1982), "Round-the-World Services,
It's All Square", Containerisation International, 16:11, 61-65.
Pearson, R. and Fossey, J. (1984), World DeeE-Sea Container
Shipping, Liverpool: Marine Transport Centre.
Rose, J. (1984), "Arab Shipping Moves Towards a Strong
Worldwide Presence", Arab Shipping 1984, London:Seatrade~
Publications, 17-19.
Sagar, K. (1985), "Round-the-World and Super Ships", American
Shipper, 27:2, 40-46.
93
Salman Ad-Hashim, S.D. (1983), "Foundations of a Strong
Arab Shipping Policy", Arab Shipping 1983, London:
Seatrade Publications, 9-13.
Schrier, E. (1984), "Wave A Flag", Transport 2000, L : 1
60-65.
Seatrade (1984), "Oceans Apart", 1 4:4, 17.
Seatrade U9 85a), "U. S. Lines Prepares to Ride the Storm",
15:1, 33-35.
Seatrade (1985b), "Defending the Lines", 15:3, 37-39.
Seatrade (1985c), "Containerisation Report", 15:5, 95-107.
Slogget, J. (1984), Shipping Finance, London:Fairp1ay.
Sturmey, S. (1984), "Administering the Code of Conduct",
Marine Policy, 8:3, 203-216.
Tot1and, T. (1980), "Protectionism in International Shipping
and Some Economic Effects", Maritime Policy and Management,
7:2, 103-114.
United Nations Confp.rence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
United Nations_Conference on Plenipotentiaries on a Code
of Conduct for Liner Conferences, (1975), Vol. 1, (TD/
Code 13).
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
The Shipping Act of 1983, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Merchant Marine on H.R. 1878, 98th Conq r e ss , First
Session, March, 1983.
U.s. Government Printing Office (1983), The Merchapt ~arine Act,
1936, The Shipping Act, 1916, and Related Acts, (As Amended
Through the 97th Congress), Washington.
U.S. Government Printing Office (1984), 46 CFR 587.2, 49:222,
45406.
Von Sydow, K. (1978), "Self Protection, Self Destruction",
5000 Weeks of Fairplay, London:Fairp1ay Publications, 17-20.
94
